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REGULATORY GUIDE

OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY GUIDE 5.56

STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT OF SAFEGUARDS

CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR TRANSPORTATION

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), directed the NRC, among other things, to develop contingency plans "...for dealing with threats, thefts, and sabotage relating to special nuclear materials, high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended...."

The principal requirements for the development of safeguards contingency plans for transportation are found in 10 CFR Part 70, "Special Nuclear Materials," and Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials." Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 identifies the requirements for a safeguards contingency plan for transportation. Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73 identifies the criteria to be followed in developing the contingency plan.

A licensee safeguards contingency plan is a document that provides guidance to licensee personnel and identifies procedures to accomplish specific, defined objectives in the event of threats, thefts, or sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities. An acceptable safeguards contingency plan must contain (1) a predetermined set of decisions and actions to satisfy stated objectives, (2) an identification of the data, criteria, procedures, and mechanisms necessary to effect efficiently the decisions and actions, and (3) a specification of the individual, group, or organizational entity responsible for each decision and action.

A safeguards contingency plan consists of five elements: (1) Background, (2) a Generic Planning Base, (3) a Licensee Planning Base, (4) a Responsibility Matrix, and (5) Procedures.

The Background contains the purpose and scope of the plan, describes the environment within which the plan will be put into effect, and defines the terms used.

The Generic Planning Base contains a list of events to be planned for and the associated objective to be reached for each event. It may also include for each event an overview of the general types of decisions and actions and other generic information helpful to the licensee in clearly presenting the planned responses to reach the objective.

The Licensee Planning Base contains the information peculiar to a given licensee: his organizational entities for contingency response tasking, facility descriptions and locations necessary for response planning and coordination, command and control functions, etc.

The Responsibility Matrix is a format used to specify the assignment of specific decisions and actions that each organizational entity takes to effect such response.

For each organizational entity, the decisions and actions, as assigned in the Responsiblity Matrix, are finally summarized in a Procedures Summary for that entity. The Procedures

Summaries that result are simplified presentations of the assigned responsibilities for use in training and implementing the plan. The Procedures Summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to the NRC for approval (see Chapter 5).

This regulatory guide presents the proposed standard format for a safeguards contingency plan for transportation and contains an example contingency plan, included as a supplement, to illustrate the guide's application. The guide may be revised to reflect comments received and additional staff review.

Purpose and Applicability

This standard format and content document has been prepared to aid in ensuring completeness of planning and presentation and to simplify the NRC review of the safeguards contingency plan. It applies to the transportation of special nuclear material that is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR § 73.30 through § 73.36 (proposed 10 CFR § 73.25 and § 73.26, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977).

This document describes the information required for a plan. Information submitted will be reviewed for completeness on the basis of the contents of this guide. If a submittal does not provide a reasonably complete presentation of the required information, final review will be delayed until the needed information is provided. It is anticipated that the safeguards contingency plan will be submitted as an attachment to the physical security plan (10 CFR § 70.22(g)). To the extent that the topics in the contingency plan are treated in adequate detail in a physical security plan, they may be incorporated by cross-reference to the security plan. The applicant or licensee should include additional information as appropriate. It is also the responsibility of the applicant or licensee to be aware of new and revised NRC regulations.

Information and procedures delineated in regulatory guides in Division 5, "Materials and Plant Protection," and technical reports and appropriate to certain sections of the physical security plan submitted under Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 or 10 CFR § 73.30 through § 73.36 (proposed 10 CFR § 73.25 and § 73.26, see 42 FR 34317, July 5, 1977) may be incorporated by reference. The applicant, licensee, or agent should discuss his plans and programs with the NRC staff before preparing his contingency plan, giving particular emphasis to the depth of information required for this plan.

Use of the Standard Format

The standard format and content is described in succeeding chapters and is illustrated in the example plan presented in the supplement. If the applicant or licensee chooses to adopt the standard format and content, he should follow the numbering system of this document at least down to the level of subsection (e.g., 3.5.1). Certain subsections may be omitted from a contingency plan if they are clearly unnecessary to provide a complete plan or if they are needlessly repetitive. In such cases appropriate adaptation of the standard format to accommodate the particular circumstances is permissible.

The applicant or licensee may wish to submit in support of his contingency plan information that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of the physical protection program. Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted in demonstration of certain criteria, discussions of alternatives considered, or supplementary data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This type of information should be clearly labeled and provided as an attachment to the submittal so that it will not be considered as a license condition.

Style and Composition

The applicant or licensee should strive for a clear, concise presentation of information that portrays the general perspective and concepts of the basic plan. Details about specific aspects of the plan may be relegated to the appendices to enhance the clarity of the presentation in the basic plan and to facilitate updating and maintenance of the information. Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the submittal and should be consistent with generally accepted usage unless otherwise defined in the document.

Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more clearly or conveniently by such means. In general, these illustrations should be located in the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to ensure that all information presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that drawings are not reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by unaided normal eyes.

A table of contents should be included in each submittal.

Physical Specifications of Submittals

All materials submitted in a safeguards contingency plan should conform to the following physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.:

1. Page Size

   Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches.
   Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches.

2. Paper Stock and Ink

   Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for microfilming.

3. Page Margins

   A margin of no less than one inch should be maintained on the top, bottom, and binding side of all pages submitted.

4. Printing

Composition: text pages should be single spaced.
Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming.
Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced.
Pages may be printed on both sides with the images printed head to head.

5. Binding

Pages should be punched for standard 3-hole looseleaf binder.

6. Page Numbering

Pages should be numbered sequentially.

7. Format References

In the application, references to this Standard Format should be by chapter and section numbers.

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages

The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis.

The changed or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a vertical line. The line should be on the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the plan should show the date of change. The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted and the pages to be removed. When major changes or additions are made, pages for a revised Table of Contents should be provided.

Number of Copies

The applicant or licensee should submit 6 copies to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Alternatively, these copies may be filed in person at the Commission's offices at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. or at 7915 Eastern Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland.

Public Disclosure

The NRC has determined that safeguards contingency plans contain information of a type specified in 10 CFR § 2.790(d) and shall be subject to disclosure only in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR § 9.12.

Compatibility

The applicant or licensee should ensure that the contingency plan is compatible with the other sections of his application. Reference to sections in the physical security plan may be made in response to information requested by this guide.

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER

Provide a statement of the perceived danger to the security of licensee personnel and licensee property posed by the possibility of attempts to commit sabotage or to steal strategic special nuclear materials. The adversary attributes assumed for safeguards contingency planning stem from those specified by NRC as a basis for current safeguards system design or upgrading. The statement contained in 10 CFR § 73.55(a) or subsequent Commission statements will suffice. The information is included in the safeguards contingency plan for ready reference and clarity with regard to the adversary capabilities that are assumed to oppose the performance of the primary security mission of the plan. The applicant or licensee should examine his operation to determine its vulnerabilities in light of the threats postulated by the Commission. This examination is to make the applicant or licensee more aware of the total scope of response and will facilitate the generation of initiating events for the Generic Planning Base.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

State the general aims and purposes underlying the implementation of the plan, e.g., the transportation activities covered, general uses intended for the plan, etc.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE PLAN

Discuss the scope of the plan by addressing the following information:

1. The general types of contingencies that have been considered, i.e., threats related to a shipment of SNM or an attempted theft or sabotage of a shipment while enroute.

2. The primary security mission (task to be accomplished) in response to an adversary incursion and the general operational concepts or approach to performing the mission. The mission statement simply reveals what is to be accomplished and when and why. The operational concept presents an overview of how the mission is to be accomplished. Also, for clarity of intent, the operational concept may indicate explicitly the conditions under which the plan might be executed, e.g., night, day, all weather, natural disasters, etc.

1.4 DEFINITIONS

Alphabetically list the terms and the corresponding definitions used in describing the operational and technical aspects of the plan.

2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE

Identify those events that signal the beginning or aggravation of a safeguards contingency according to how they are first perceived by the licensee's or transportation agent's personnel, as applicable. A sufficient number of events should be identified to cover the range of possible safeguards contingencies that are envisioned. Generic specification of the events is suggested to limit the number that are required for the plan. Refer to Appendix A of the supplement for examples illustrating the manner of specifying these events.

For each event identified, specify the objective to be accomplished by the operational elements when they respond to that particular event. In selecting an objective, consideration should be given to uncertainties about the situation that generally will prevail as of the time the subject events occur. For example, if information available at the time is likely to be so vague that the operational elements will be uncertain whether or not an adversary incursion is in progress, an appropriate objective for the event would involve determining what the actual situation is. Attainment of this objective would in turn clarify the situation and lead to the next event and objective most appropriate for the continued response in order to accomplish the primary security mission, which is reflected in Section 1.3.

In addition to the required information above, other information that is helpful to the licensee (or transportation agent) in preparing or clearly presenting the general nature of the planned responses to achieve the selected objectives may be included in the generic planning base. For example, listing of the categories of actions or the general approach that will be taken by the overall response organization to accomplish a given objective may be helpful in planning, assigning, and subsequent training of personnel in the specific response actions developed in the Responsibility Matrix relating to that objective. Such listing would be tantamount to presenting a limited operational concept that is specifically applicable to the attainment of the particular objective. Another type of information that may be helpful for ready reference is an illustration that shows sequential relationships among all the generic events and objectives utilized for planning.

3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE

In successive paragraphs, briefly present information about the licensee's organization, infrastructure, capabilities, constraints, law enforcement assistance, and other considerations that bear upon the execution of the contingency responses of the plan. Only current capabilities should be reflected to ensure realistic prospects for plan execution in the event of a contingency during the current period. Where applicable, reference may be made to parts of the physical security plan where pertinent information is adequately presented, rather than repeating the particular information in the safeguards contingency plan. Types of information that should be considered for inclusion in the plan are further described below. Use additional paragraphs as necessary to present other pertinent information.

3.1 LICENSEE'S (OR TRANSPORTATION AGENT'S) ORGANIZATION FOR SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY RESPONSE

Provide a description of the organization adopted for purposes of planning, assigning, and conducting coordinated safeguards contingency response actions to attain the specified objectives presented in the Generic Planning Base. This task organization should reflect the type of personnel and principal equipments composing the various operational entities that appear in the Responsibility Matrix and Procedures Summaries; these are the entities in the plan that implement detailed contingency response actions. The general procedure for designating the leaders and alternate leaders and the composition of the operational entities for a specific shipment should also be reflected in this paragraph.

3.2 ROUTE INFORMATION

Information on planned road routes routinely used to transport SNM in quantities requiring physical protection should be presented in this paragraph, either directly or by reference to pertinent appendices of the basic plan. For brevity and clarity of presentation in the basic plan, the route information generally is best presented in appendices; one appendix should be devoted to each planned route.

With regard to assembling necessary data for planned road routes, it is contemplated that NRC will undertake a task to cover the most commonly and frequently used routes for interstate transport of protected SNM. When the information is compiled on a route, NRC will provide it to licensees or their agents. The licensees or their agents may include this information in their respective transportation safeguards contingency plans with the understanding that they accept responsibility for its continued accuracy.

For routes used as a matter of convenience to a particular licensee or agent when a suitable NRC planned route is available or for one-time or seldom-used routes, the licensee or his agent is responsible for assembling the necessary data and planning the route. The plan for such a route should be submitted to NRC for review and approval if it is contemplated as an addition to the safeguards contingency plan by the licensee or agent.

For each route, the route information should include route segment identifications, pertinent time and distance factors, route reference points and directions to locations of pertinent law enforcement facilities, and the expected response capabilities of the associated law enforcement agencies. Tables and charts required for presentation of the information are illustrated in Appendix E of the example plan presented in the Supplement and are further explained below.

1. Route Overview - This is a graphic display of the overall route presented on one or more sheets. It may be a line diagram as in the example plan, or it may be depicted on a road map. The map or diagram should be large enough in scale to clearly indicate the pertinent law enforcement agency (LEA) to be contacted for contingency assistance. The planned route segments should be reflected on the display. Route segments selected for planning should have easily recognized geographic features as boundaries and should be easily correlated with the pertinent LEA. For example, if a pertinent LEA is a county sheriff's department, a route segment marked by the county boundaries (if easily recognized on the ground) or other geographic features near

the county boundaries would be appropriate. The enroute overview should also show the location of each pertinent LEA relative to the route, the route's origin and destination, state boundaries as applicable, and other information that will aid in rapidly correlating route position with the LEA appropriate for that position.

2. Time and Distance Factors - This is a table showing the following information for each planned route segment:

a. Identification code of the segment.
b. LEA pertinent to the segment.
c. Segment boundaries (start and end points).
d. Distance of the segment in road miles.
e. Total trip miles traveled from origin to end of the segment.
f. Average time required to transit the segment.
g. Total trip time elapsed at the end of the segment.
h. Estimated variability in time for crossing the segment and the variability of total trip time at the end of the segment.
i. Critical reference points that give detailed route instructions for movement to the location of the pertinent LEA.

3. Law Enforcement Response Summary - This is a table that summarizes for each pertinent LEA the expected response, the emergency telephone numbers and other communications means, and selected segment information. It provides quick reference data to facilitate communication with pertinent LEA and to estimate response times after the contact.

4. Law Enforcement Capabilities - This is a brief narrative description of the LEA capabilities. The description should be adequate to provide the enroute supervisor a general overview of each enroute LEA's strength, mobility, communications, weapons, and other capabilities that are available if needed.

3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERFACE AND ASSISTANCE

For the transportation safeguards contingency plan, details regarding LEA assistance along road routes are more simply presented in connection with the applicable route information (see Section 3.2). Therefore, simple reference in this section to the location of that LEA information in the plan serves to highlight it for ready reference. Other general LEA information not contained in the referenced material, however, may be applicable to this section. For example, to enhance clarity, this section might also be used to briefly describe the general nature of requests for enroute LEA assistance that will be made if the need arises. Other general information regarding LEA assistance deemed appropriate for clarity or emphasis by the licensee or agent may be included.

3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Identify laws, company policies, or other factors that will substantially constrain or otherwise influence execution of response actions during contingency situations. This may include, but need not be limited to, the following areas as applicable:

1. Extent to which local, county, and State law enforcement will be depended on to protect shipments against adversary intrusion and theft incidents.

2. Extent to which company employees will be allowed to perform hazardous physical security duties incident to accomplishing safeguards contingency response actions.

3. Extent to which enroute personnel can assist LEA in hot pursuit operations.

4. Equipment performance constraints dictating specially planned procedures.

3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Information concerning the planned control arrangements and the use and operation of the various means of communication (licensee and LEA as applicable) during safeguards contingency response operations should be included in this section. Emphasis should be on the planned operating procedures that are to apply for coordination of the various operational entities involved.

The information on control arrangements should clearly reflect who controls what and when. Also, as applicable, the manner of passing control from one point of leadership to another during progress of a contingency situation should be specific. The leader of any operational entity is presumed to be in control of that entity unless otherwise specified.

With regard to communications, the allocation, control, and usage of the various means of communications should be specific along with any special instructions that apply regarding operation of the equipment. As applicable, the specification and use of various codes for rapid communication of situational information also are appropriate items for this section. Details may be relegated to an appendix in the interest of clarity in the basic plan.

3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS

As applicable, information of operational significance to the utilization of safeguards systems equipment may be included here or elsewhere in the plan, as desired for clarity. For example, the location of special weapons and protective equipment that are available if needed might be indicated here or in the section on operational elements. Also, information concerning communications equipment might be more appropriately included in the control and communications section than here. Information of interest in this section is the type that is necessary to coordinate commitment or use of the equipment during contingency response operations, e.g., its location if not installed, who obtains it, what operating modes apply and when, the readiness

state maintained, etc. Descriptive information on system configuration and technical performance characteristics may be included by reference to appropriate parts of an approved transportation physical security plan if such information is felt necessary in the interest of clarity. If no information is included in this section, the simple statement "This section not used", should be inserted.

3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Describe any special arrangements and practices that are maintained or implemented to ensure adequate administrative and logistical support incident to enroute safeguards contingency events.

The descriptions should include provisions for ensuring that all equipment and expendable supplies needed to effectively deal with an enroute safeguards contingency will be easily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient supply. Particular attention should be focused on extra supplies and equipment such as radio batteries, ammunition, special weapons, gas masks, body armor, and helmets that could substantially affect the effectiveness of response personnel.

Include also the planned arrangement for provision of necessary emergency services incident to enroute safeguard contingency operations, such as medical evacuation and treatment of casualties, health physics, and vehicle maintenance. If standard procedures are applicable in that regard, a statement and brief explanation to that effect is appropriate.

4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Develop a Responsibility Matrix corresponding to the Generic Planning Base. The tabulations in the Responsibility Matrix should provide an overall picture of the response actions and their interrelationships.

The Responsibility Matrix illustrated below is in array format to facilitate systematic presentation and crosscheck of the contingency response actions planned for each operational element. The three dimensions depicted are: "Events," "Operational Elements," and "Decisions-Actions."



Each Event should correspond to one of the contingency events selected in the Generic Planning Base (Chapter 2). The Decisions-Actions for each Event should delineate the decisions and actions and their assignment to the responsible Operational Element (Sections 3.1 and 3.3) so as to gain the objective associated with that Event in the Generic Planning Base. One or more pages may be used to present the contingency actions associated with each event, depending on the number of operational elements involved in the plan and the amount of column width allocated for each operational element. The matrix format shown in the "Representative Safeguards Contingency Plan for Road Transportation" contained in the Supplement has spaces for five different operational elements on two pages of presentation for each contingency event; however, more or less may be used as necessary.

It may be noted that the example matrix contained in the Supplement also shows the objective associated with each contingency event in two places: the first column and at the top in one other column. The presentation is for ease of reference. The first column permits quick reference during development and maintenance of the plan, and the other column serves to identify the particular operational element that decides when that objective has been attained.

Safeguards responsibilities must be assigned in a manner that precludes conflicts in duties or responsibilities that would prevent the execution of the plan in any safeguards contingency.

5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY

Develop a Procedures Summary for each operational element that summarizes the actions from the Responsibility Matrix for assignment to that operational element. The set of Procedures Summaries that results is to aid in the assignment and training of tasks for effective implementation of the plan. The procedures summary, although part of the contingency plan, does not have to be submitted to NRC for approval. It will be prepared and maintained at the licensee's facility and will be inspected by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement to ensure compliance with the Responsibility Matrix.

Each Procedures Summary should provide clear and concise statements of the general responsibilities of the operational element during any safeguards contingency and of the specific actions assigned with respect to the range of contingency events covered in the plan. In that regard, show where a task begins and follow its progress through each operational element until the task is completed; i.e., show the actions that each of the operational elements accomplishes to carry out the task. In summarizing actions from the Responsibility Matrix, a given set of summary statements may be utilized to cover more than one event when the events involved require the same or effectively the same type of actions. Also, where a given action is found to be common procedure for a number of operational elements, regardless of the specific contingency, that action may be included in a summary grouping of standard operating procedures for presentation in each of the procedures summaries. Statements of standard operating procedures may also reflect information of general interest to all operational entities, for example, the assignment of overall control responsibilities.

To facilitate operations, the licensee may wish to condense key portions of the Procedures Summary to checklist format according to stages of increased preparedness to respond. For example, events deemed to require a comparable level of preparedness may be grouped under some predetermined alert code, e.g., yellow alert for conditions that are not perceived as imminent but do require a further enhanced state of readiness (some expressed threats, non-threatening civil demonstrations, unresolved perimeter alarms, etc.). When the condition is evaluated and deemed to require an enhanced state of readiness, the alert posture is increased to an appropriate higher level, e.g., orange or red. In effect, the events are grouped in alert categories by their sensitivity and assessed immediacy. To achieve the assigned alert status, checklists are used by each operational element as reminders to perform specificially assigned duties.

SUPPLEMENT

A REPRESENTATIVE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLAN

FOR ROAD TRANSPORTATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 PERCEIVED DANGER

For planning purposes, it is assumed that an adversary incursion against the shipment to steal or to sabotage the cargo could occur at any time while enroute with little or no prior warning. Also, as a hoax or with serious intent, a potential adversary could threaten to steal or sabotage the cargo. The assumed adversaries may be well-trained and dedicated persons with no responsibility for the shipment (external adversaries) or knowledgeable persons with assigned responsibilities with respect to the shipment (internal adversaries). It is assumed that an attempted incursion will be well planned and rehearsed and will be directed toward accomplishing the adversary mission and withdrawing from the scene as quickly as possible.

An external adversary may include one to a small group of armed or unarmed persons. If armed, their weapons could vary from hand guns and shotguns to mixtures of weapons such as automatic rifles and explosives. Tactics employed might include armed hijack, ruse, duress, rolling or static ambush, or opportunistic theft of the cargo carrier. Coordinated team movements and use of weapons might be employed in furtherance of these tactics. External adversaries might also be assisted by an internal conspirator.

An internal adversary may be a member of the enroute elements (Escort or Transporter) and thus would be armed as the enroute elements are. Such an individual may endeavor to steal the cargo himself through use of force or ruse or to assist external adversaries by decoying the shipment or by creating diversions that may weaken the cargo vehicle's security coverage. An internal adversary not a member of the enroute elements might also be involved in a conspiracy with an external adversary. In such cases, the internal adversary may assist the external by providing specific shipment information or by deceptions to cover the activities of the external adversary.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

This document presents the safeguards contingency plan for road transportation of a representative company that provides transportation for nuclear materials that require physical protection for compliance with NRC regulations. The plan was prepared to guide and coordinate response actions of the operating elements involved against perceived or actual incursion attempts to steal or sabotage the cargo of a road shipment.

1.3 SCOPE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE PLAN

1.3.1 Types of Contingencies and Responses that have been Considered

Responses to deal with and prevent successful execution of threats and attempts of theft of SNM and sabotage are covered in the plan. The safeguards contingency plan does not include any actions under emergency plans concerned with hazards to public health and safety that are

the consequence of nuclear accidents other than steps to initiate the implementation of such emergency plans even though those accidents may result from acts of threats, thefts, or sabotage.

1.3.2 Operational Concept in Response to an Adversary Incursion

The primary security mission of the operating elements is to protect the cargo at all times during its road shipment from point of origin to point of destination to prevent theft or sabotage of any part of the cargo.

This mission is accomplished routinely by protecting the cargo at all times and by coordination among the operational elements to ensure a high state of readiness to deal with contingency situations if they occur.

MVMT Control maintains current information of the shipment's status and the on-going enroute situation and coordinates with enroute LEA as necessary to ensure early LEA awareness of possible security threats against the shipment. Additionally, the enroute elements continuously guard the cargo in transit and maintain all-around security surveillance of the local scene to avoid being surprised by incursions against the shipment if they are attempted. Cargo stowage is kept locked, sealed, and alarmed, as applicable, and the transporter moves via well-traveled routes at maximum speed limits when possible, making only essential stops.

To accomplish the mission under the extraordinary circumstances of a contingency situation, the enroute elements will contact the pertinent LEA for assistance as necessary and will deal with the situation to protect the shipment until the LEA response effectively develops. As a hedge against the chance that enroute elements may not be able to contact the LEA in an emergency, MVMT Control will request assistance of pertinent LEA in the event that enroute elements fail to render a report as expected. The mobility of the shipment will be used by enroute elements to avoid a perceived incursion wherever possible. Otherwise, depending on the nature and strength of the adversary, enroute elements will block or delay the incursion to prevent penetration of the cargo transporter. In the event an adversary gains possession of any part of the cargo and endeavors to depart, enroute elements will follow and maintain contact as necessary to assist LEA convergence in pursuit.

1.4 DEFINITIONS

Terms and expressions used in the plan are alphabetically listed and defined below for ease of reference.

Term	Definition
(A)	Notation used in Responsibility Matrix, Appendix C, that indicates an action is always taken; the action may be a hedge against uncertainty or necessary in light of the situation.
(C)	Notation used in Responsibility Matrix, Appendix C, that indicates an action may or may not be taken depending on the obvious circumstances of the situation.

CB	Citizens band radio.
ETA	Estimated time of arrival.
ETD	Estimated time of departure.
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation.
FCC	Federal Communications Commission.
ID	Identification.
LEA	Law enforcement agency(ies).
MT	Mobile radiotelephone.
MVMT	Movement.
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region _____, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Sabotage	A malevolent act that damages and results in dispersal of nuclear material.
Shipper	The terminal element--consignor or consignee--who arranged with the company providing nuclear materials transportation services for the nuclear shipment of concern.
SNM	Special nuclear material.
Stolen SNM	SNM that has been acquired unlawfully and is being held in a safe haven by the thief.

2. GENERIC PLANNING BASE

The operational elements indicated in Section 3.1 will respond as a team to events that either suggest or reveal an adversary incursion against the shipment. The types of events experienced and the clarity of the situation at the time will depend on the nature of the incursion, the state to which the situation has progressed, and the amount of interaction that has occurred between the adversary and the operational elements. The total response from start to finish will be a dynamic process conditioned by the circumstances of the situation as it progresses. As a means of planning for contingencies, a set of 16 events has been specified to cover the range of events that will trigger contingency response actions by the operational elements. For each of these events, the most important objective to be achieved by the operational elements responding to the particular event has been identified. Attainment of the objective will improve the situation to the extent possible at the time and will lead to the next event and the objective most appropriate for continued dealing with the situation.

Appendix A summarizes the events and objectives of the Generic Planning Base and codes each combination for ease of access to the detailed task planning reflected in the Responsibility Matrix (Appendix C).

3. LICENSEE PLANNING BASE

3.1 OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

The following operational elements are the organizational entities adopted for purposes of assigning and executing the road transportation security response tasks and procedures identified in this plan. The designated leaders and specific composition of the operational entities are specified in the instructions issued for each shipment.

Functional Category	Operational Elements
Transportation	1. Escort 2. Transporter 3. MVMT Control
Terminal Elements	4. Consignor 5. Consignee

1. Escort is tailored to provide the security needs for a given shipment in light of the cargo that is to be protected, the vulnerability of the route that will be used, and the response capabilities of the pertinent enroute LEA. The Escort includes:

a. One or more unmarked cars equipped with mobile telephone, citizens band radio, vehicle-to-vehicle VHF communications, and shotguns.

b. At least two armed guards per vehicle, inclusive of the driver.

2. Transporter includes the cargo transporter equipped with mobile telephone, citizens band radio, vehicle-to-vehicle VHF communications, and shotguns. The Transporter may also feature armored-protected crew compartment, firing ports, and an enclosed cargo trailer with an immobilization system. If an open cargo trailer is employed, individual cargo containers will weigh at least 500 pounds. Normally two armed guards, inclusive of the driver, constitute the crew of the Transporter.

3. MVMT Control includes:

a. An adequately furnished operations center room with dedicated telephone equipment and the pertinent transportation plan and shipment plan information.

b. One or more staff members inclusive of the Operations Center supervisor, as needed for continuous operational coverage of on-going shipments.

4. The Consignor and Consignee are represented by the shipper and receiver staff members designated to monitor the shipment status and to make operational decisions and arrangements concerning the shipment in coordination with MVMT Control.

3.2 ROUTE INFORMATION

Pertinent time and distance data and law enforcement jurisdictions needed for shipment planning and operations are presented for each route in a series of appendices to this plan (see, for example, Appendix E).

3.3 LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE

Selected law enforcement agencies (LEA) whose jurisdictions are crossed when the shipment is enroute will be requested, as needed, to provide contingency assistance to the shipment. LEA contacts and capabilities for assistance along a particular route are presented in the appendix for that route. In general, the enroute LEA will be depended on to provide assistance by investigating and providing information on suspicious activity and events, by dealing with unlawful incursions against the shipment, and by providing assistance to arrange local supporting services and traffic control when required.

3.4 POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

The following constraints and assumptions are reflected in this plan and will influence the conduct of operational activities during execution:

1. Enroute elements will depend on available LEA assistance to the maximum extent possible to deal with unlawful incursions against the shipment.

2. Enroute elements will use firearms only as a last resort when other tactics fail to provide adequate protection of the shipment or enroute personnel against violent incursion attempts.

3. Enroute elements will conduct operations to protect the shipment in a manner that avoids injury to innocent bystanders and needless damage to private or public property.

4. It is possible that enroute elements will be unable to use the mobile electronic communications equipment to report the situation and request LEA assistance during the emergency because of communication dead zones that exist along the route for the operating equipment.

3.5 CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Communications equipment and procedures used during a shipment are indicated in Appendix B. The control relationships among the operating elements are presented below:

3.5.1 Enroute Elements

1. The enroute supervisor will be designated in the movement order for a shipment. The enroute supervisor will designate an alternate to ensure continuity of control enroute. The enroute supervisor controls the operation of enroute elements, i.e.;

- directs the movement and overall response actions of enroute elements.

- requests assistance and coordinates operations with the LEA providing response assistance.

- ensures that reports as required from enroute elements are made.

2. Escort and Transporter elements submit reports and request LEA assistance as dictated by the situation; Escort will normally be relied upon for such contacts to preclude stops by Transporter.

3.5.2 MVMT Control

1. Accomplishes necessary coordination with Shipper (Consignor and Consignee, as applicable) during the shipment.

2. Monitors the status of the shipment and the enroute situation.

3. Coordinates with pertinent LEA to obtain investigative and security assistance as required and to inform LEA of possible security threats against the shipment.

3.5.3 Consignor and Consignee

Shipper coordinates with MVMT Control to monitor the shipment and to provide support and supervisory assistance to enroute elements as required.

3.5.4 Enroute LEA

1. Directs and coordinates local operations of LEA response forces.

2. Coordinates with other LEA as required to obtain additional investigative and response assistance if needed.

3. Coordinates local enroute LEA response operations with the enroute supervisor.

3.6 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS

This section not used.

3.7 ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL

3.7.1 Enroute Supplies

1. Transporter and Escort vehicle will be refueled at times selected to minimize enroute stops and to randomly vary the refueling points utilized along a route.

2. Spare replacement batteries for portable electronic equipment will be carried by enroute elements as appropriate to the type of equipment being used.

3. Extra ammunition will be carried in each vehicle for the weapons available in that vehicle.

3.7.2 Vehicle Maintenance

Enroute requirements for vehicle maintenance and evacuation service will be reported to MVMT Control. MVMT Control will arrange for the service in accordance with company maintenance procedures.

3.7.3 Medical Services

Local enroute hospitals will be used for emergency medical treatment. Emergency medical evacuation to the hospitals can be arranged through contact with the pertinent enroute LEA.

3.7.4 Health Physics Service

In the event of cargo dispersal while enroute due to adversary action or an accident, additional radiation monitoring service as required will be arranged by MVMT Control through contact with the Consignor or Consignee and DOE radiological assistance, as appropriate. Pertinent LEA may also be contacted to arrange for local civil defense preparedness assistance where applicable.

3.7.5 Materials Handling

In the event Transporter immobilization requires transfer of the cargo to another vehicle, MVMT Control will arrange with the Consignor or Consignee, as appropriate, for advisory personnel to monitor and assist in the transfer. MVMT Control will also arrange for the replacement carrier, materials handling equipment, and necessary additional labor as required.

4. RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Within the context of the general responsibilities that are assigned to each operating element, the planning of detailed tasks to support the attainment of the contingency objectives (specified in the Generic Planning Base, Appendix A) has been accomplished through use of the Responsibility Matrix in Appendix C. This appendix also lists tasks for the operating elements that are assigned and practiced as standard operating procedure during a shipment to enhance the readiness of the operating elements for executing the specific tasks reflected in the Responsibility Matrix.

5. PROCEDURES SUMMARY

To facilitate training and plan implementation, a Procedures Summary for each operating element is contained in Appendix D. These procedures present the general responsibilities of

the operating elements, the applicable standard operating procedures, and summaries of the contingency task sequences that are assigned the elements via the Responsibility Matrix (Appendix C). In the event security contingencies that are not reflected in the contingency task sequences occur, operational elements will coordinate their response in accordance with the general responsibilities and standard operating procedures indicated in the procedures summary so as to accomplish the primary security mission (Subsection 1.3.2).

APPENDIX A

EVENTS AND OBJECTIVES FOR CONTINGENCY RESPONSES

ID Code	Events	Response Objectives	Conditional Jumps
T1	Explicit threat to steal or sabotage cargo in transit is received before shipment departs.	Determine if threat as perceived is serious.	If serious, go to T4.
T2	Explicit threat to steal or sabotage cargo in transit is received while enroute.	Determine if threat as perceived is serious.	If serious, go to T4.
T3	A civil disturbance or other suspicious situation is encountered while enroute.	Determine if threat as perceived is serious.	If serious, go to T6.
T4	Licensee/Agent or Enroute Elements perceive T1 or T2 serious.	Prevent theft or sabotage of cargo.	
T5	Duly constituted authority perceives a serious threat against SNM cargo in transit.	Prevent theft or sabotage of cargo.	
T6	Enroute Elements perceive T3 serious.	Prevent theft or sabotage of cargo.	If attack imminent, go to T8 or T9.
T7	Event occurs while enroute that temporarily degrades certain enroute safeguards.	Determine perceived magnitude of danger.	If danger, go to T8 or T9.
T8	Attack is perceived imminent or develops while Transporter is at a stop.	Prevent theft or sabotage of cargo.	If theft or sabotage, go to T10, T11, T16.
T9	Attack is perceived imminent or develops while Transporter is moving.	Prevent theft or sabotage of cargo.	If theft or sabotage, go to T10, T11, T16.
T10	Attack or accident has occurred; Transporter or Escort is damaged without dispersal of SNM cargo.	Restore protection of the shipment.	
T11	Attack, sabotage, or accident has occurred; Transporter is damaged and SNM dispersed.	Restore protection of the shipment.	If theft, go to T16.
T12	Code reserved for future revision.		
T13	Enroute Elements are reported delayed or diverted from the planned route.	Determine if SNM has been stolen or sabotaged.	If theft or sabotage, go to T10, T11, T16.
T14	MVMT Control does not receive expected report from Enroute Elements.	Determine if SNM has been stolen or sabotaged.	If theft or sabotage, go to T10, T11, T16.
T15	Enroute Elements do not arrive at destination as expected.	Determine if SNM has been stolen or sabotaged.	If theft or sabotage, go to T10, T11, T16.
T16	SNM in transit has been stolen.	Report theft to NRC and FBI.	

APPENDIX B

COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES

1. PURPOSE

To outline procedures for use of radio equipment and other communications.

2. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

Radio equipment with enroute elements normally includes mobile radiotelephones, citizens band radios, and vehicle-to-vehicle radios. In addition, regular telephone communications are used by operating elements as required.

a. Mobile Radiotelephones (MT)

- One located in TRANSPORTER, one in each ESCORT vehicle
- Used as the primary mobile means of communication with the enroute elements for contact with MVMT CONTROL and enroute LEA.
- Features:
  - Eleven VHF channels available in the frequency band from 152 to 162 MHz.
  - Channel selection pertinent to operating area is by manual pushbutton system.
  - Direct dialing or operator assisted calls are possible.
  - The MT generally must be within 20 miles of a phone-patching central for the system to be used.
  - Unreliable zones for MT communication and locations of phone-patching centrals for the routes of this plan are shown in Enclosure 1 of Appendix E.

Operating Information:

- Enroute elements MT number shown on the equipment will be included in the movement order for a particular shipment.
- The operator of the MT will announce the telephone number of the unit before terminating a call to comply with FCC rules.

b. CB Radio Transceivers

- One located in TRANSPORTER, one each ESCORT vehicle.
- Used as the alternative mobile means of communication for contact with MVMT CONTROL or enroute LEA in emergency situations, either directly or by relay as necessary; used when MT is ineffective.

- Also provides alternative mobile means of vehicle-to-vehicle communication in the event VHF transceiver fails.

- Features:
  - Twenty-three HF AM channels available in the frequency band from 26.965 to 27.225 MHz.
  - Omnidirectional dipole antenna.
  - Mobile-to-base communications range: 1 to 10 miles; mobile-to-mobile communications range: 1 to 5 miles.
  - Locations of enroute LEA and REACT CB capabilities for the routes of this plan are shown in Enclosure 1 of Appendix E.

- Operating Information:
  - CB call sign for Enroute Elements is _____.
  - Operator of CB will announce above call sign before terminating a call to comply with FCC rules.
  - Channel 9 is the emergency CB channel; REACT groups and many LEA routinely monitor this channel. Channel 19 is currently monitored widely by truckers. Information relay can generally be accomplished via either of these channels; channel 9 relays, however, must be of an emergency nature.

c. VHF Radio Transceivers

- Each enroute vehicle is equipped with a unit.

- The primary mobile means of vehicle-to-vehicle communication.

- Features:
  - Two VHF FM channels, both set to the single company operating frequency of _____ MHz.
  - Omnidirectional dipole antenna.
  - Communication range: 10 to 20 miles.

- Hand portable units are available with Enroute Elements for off-vehicle communications.

- Operating Information:
  - VHF call sign for enroute elements is _____.
  - Operator of VHF radio will announce above call sign before terminating a call to comply with FCC rules.

d. Regular Telephone Calls

Used as the primary non-mobile means of communication from enroute elements to MVMT CONTROL and enroute LEA, and between MVMT CONTROL, the LEA, CONSIGNOR, and CONSIGNEE.

- Operating Information:
  - ESCORT will make stops for necessary telephone usage by enroute elements in order to minimize requirements for TRANSPORTER stops.
  - MVMT CONTROL is located at _____, _____, telephone (___) ___-____; collect calls from LEA and enroute elements will be accepted.
  - LEA telephone numbers for the routes of this plan are in Enclosure 3 of Appendix E.
  - CONSIGNOR and CONSIGNEE telephone numbers will be indicated in the movement order for a particular shipment.

3. GENERAL OPERATING RULES AND CONSTRAINTS

a. Company enroute elements will be identified as _____ (Co. name) Special Number _____ (Truck Number) in transmissions to LEA or for relay to LEA or MVMT CONTROL.

b. Requests to CB REACT or other CB units for message relay to LEA or MVMT CONTROL will include name and telephone number of pertinent addressee.

c. In the absence of a universally applicable standard code, the use of code words for communicating emergency information to non-company element is discouraged.

d. Transmissions will be as short as possible consistent with assuring clarity of meaning.

e. Radio channel will not be used whenever it is being actively used by another unit. To indicate that the channel is free for others to use, termination of the last transmission of a radio conversation will be with the word "out," preceded by the pertinent company radio call sign.

4. TESTS AND MAINTENANCE

a. Prior to departure of a shipment, all communication equipment will be checked and maintained as necessary to ensure proper operation.

b. During periods of communication inactivity while enroute, communication checks with CB and FM radio will be accomplished at least hourly to be aware of any communication deficiencies.

APPENDIX C

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

Content — Page

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

The following listed tasks are assigned and practiced as standard operating procedure during a shipment to enhance the readiness of the operating elements for executing the tasks reflected in the Responsibility Matrix attached.

ESCORT and TRANSPORTER (Enroute Elements):

1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform MVMT CONTROL of:

   - present location, enroute situation, next starting time
   - expected time and location of next planned report to MVMT CONTROL. (A)

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor designates and briefs a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event mobile electronic communications fail. (A)

3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously. Members not in visual contact with Enroute Elements (at stops) will use the hand portable radios. (A)

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information to each other by the most expeditious means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice. (A)

5. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to block surprise penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immobilize cargo vehicle as dictated by the situation. (A)

6. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPORTER to permit continuous observation, but not close enough to present a single target. (A)

7. At TRANSPORTER stops, dispose the guards to obtain coverage of the TRANSPORTER position; ideally such positions would provide close-by cover for guard protection, good observation and fields of fire covering the TRANSPORTER position, and mutual support among the guards. (A)

MVMT CONTROL:

1. As indicated by the enroute security situation, contact each pertinent LEA in advance of TRANSPORTER arrival in the respective jurisdiction and inform them of: (C)

- the ID of Enroute Elements (company name, special number)
- nature of shipment (handling nuclear cargo)
- route and direction of movement
- ETA and ETD for the jurisdiction
- the enroute security situation of concern

2. Provide information, investigative assistance, and support as requested by Enroute Elements or dictated by situation. (A)

3. Maintain information on current status of shipment.

4. Keep Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate) informed as to changes in movement plan and schedule, and of extraordinary enroute situations. (A)

CONSIGNOR and CONSIGNEE (Terminal Elements):

1. Report expected and actual shipment departure and arrival times to each other as applicable. (A)

2. Maintain current information on changes in movement plan and schedule; keep each other informed as appropriate. (A)

3. Provide safe haven for TRANSPORTER vehicle upon arrival and unloading of cargo into appropriately protected facilities from TRANSPORTER. (A)

4. Shipper keeps NRC informed, as appropriate, of changes in movement plan and schedule and of extraordinary enroute situations. (A)

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T1-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
	General Tasks		
EXPLICIT THREAT TO STEAL OR SABOTAGE CARGO IN TRANSIT IS RECEIVED BEFORE SHIPMENT DEPARTS.	Report without delay all threat information to the Enroute Supervisor and as directed to MVMT CONTROL and to the shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable). (A)		Report without delay all threat information to shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) and to ESCORT and TRANSPORTER as appropriate. (A)
OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS.			Assist CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE in assessing threat as requested. (A)

T1-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Reports threat information to local FBI and to pertinent NRC Regional Headquarters. (A) - Assists in assessing threat as requested. (A)	CONSIGNOR (or CONSIGNEE if applicable) DETERMINES IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS. ← General Tasks → 1. Report without delay all threat information to: a. MVMT CONTROL as appropriate. (A) b. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) c. NRC. (A) 2. Assemble available information on threat and adversary from: a. NRC. (A) b. Pertinent LEAs. (A) c. MVMT CONTROL and CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) 3. Analyze available information to assess seriousness of threat. (A) 4. Decide if threat should be considered serious. (A) 5. If threat is perceived serious go to event T-4. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T2-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
	General Tasks		
EXPLICIT THREAT TO STEAL OR SABOTAGE CARGO IN TRANSIT IS RECEIVED WHILE ENROUTE. OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS.	Report without delay to the Enroute Supervisor and as directed to MVMT CONTROL all threat information and on-scene assessment of situation as applicable. (A)		DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS - Report without delay all threat information to: a. ESCORT and TRANSPORTER as appropriate. (A) b. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) c. NRC. (A) - Assemble available information on threat adversary from: a. NRC. (A) b. Enroute elements and CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A) c. Pertinent LEAs. (A) - Analyze available information to assess seriousness of threat. (A) - If threat is perceived serious go to event T-4. (A)

T2-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Reports threat information to local FBI and to pertinent NRC Regional Headquarters. (A) - Assists in assessing threat as requested. (A)	← General Tasks →	
	Report without delay all threat information to MVMT CONTROL and to CONSIGNOR/ CONSIGNEE as appropriate. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T3-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
A CIVIL DISTURBANCE OR OTHER SUSPICIOUS SITUATION IS ENCOUNTERED WHILE ENROUTE, e.g., - Protest demonstration or labor strike. - Unexpected route detour. - Unexplained road blockage. - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem. - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol. - Suspicious persons tailing shipment. - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop. - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of TRANSPORTER. OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS.	ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL DETERMINE IF THREAT AS PERCEIVED IS SERIOUS --- - Assist TRANSPORTER movements to avoid situation completely or until it is determined to be non-serious. (A) - Accomplish investigations as necessary to obtain information needed for assessing the situation. (A) - Report ESCORT observations and situation to Enroute supervisor and assist in assessment of situation. (A) Enroute Supervisor Will - Direct actions as necessary to collect and assemble information needed for assessing the situation, e.g., a. Query MVMT CONTROL or pertinent LEA. (C) b. Dispatch of ESCORT patrol to investigate and report. (C) c. Observation of situational activity. (A) - Analyze available information and decide if situation is serious. (A) - If situation is perceived serious, go to event T6. (A)	- In coordination with ESCORT accomplish TRANSPORTER movements to avoid the situation. (A) - Report TRANSPORTER observations and situation to Enroute Supervisor and assist in assessment of situation. (A)	NA

T3-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Provides information and investigative assistance as requested. (A)	NA	NA

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T4-1 EVENT/OBJECTIVE	MOVER ELEMENTS ENROUTE ELEMENTS ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
LICENSEE/AGENT OR ENROUTE ELEMENTS PERCEIVE T1 OR T2 SERIOUS. OBJECTIVE: PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO.	PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO General Tasks As directed by Enroute Supervisor in coordination with MVMT CONTROL, implement increased readiness, e.g., a. Cancellation or delay of shipment. (C) b. Use of alternative route or safe haven. (C) c. Increased guard/escort strength. (C) d. Arrangements for and coordination with LEA escorts. (C) e. Review and use security tactics and procedures as applicable: (C) - Escort actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops. - Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formation and actions to increase adversary operational problems and reduce vulnerability. - Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols. - Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops. - Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guards and TRANSPORTER positions.		- As necessary, coordinate with shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) and with enroute elements and LEA to arrange for increased readiness appropriate to perceived seriousness of the threat. (A) - In coordination with shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) report perceived seriousness of threat and the increased readiness measures to NRC. (A)

T4-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Provides escort and is prepared to reinforce security of shipment, as arranged in coordination with MVMT CONTROL. (A)	← Tasks Performed by Shipper →	
	1. Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements and LEA, or for cancellation or delay of shipment, as appropriate to the assessed seriousness of the threat situation. (A)	
	2. Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and contemplated enroute readiness actions to NRC. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T5-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY PERCEIVES A SERIOUS THREAT AGAINST SNM CARGO IN TRANSIT. OBJECTIVE: PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO.	PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO General Tasks As directed by Enroute Supervisor in coordination with MVMT CONTROL, implement increased readiness, e.g., a. Cancellation or delay of shipment. (C) b. Use of alternative route or safe haven. (C) c. Increased guard/escort strength. (C) d. Arrangements for and coordination with LEA escorts. (C) e. Review and use security tactics and procedures as applicable: (C) - Escort actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops. - Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formation and actions to increase adversary operational problems and reduce vulnerability. - Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols. - Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops. - Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guards of TRANSPORTER positions.		- As necessary, coordinate with shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) and with enroute elements and LEA to arrange for increased readiness appropriate to the perceived seriousness of the threat. (A) - In coordination with shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) report perceived seriousness of threat and the increased readiness measures to NRC. (A)

T5-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Provides escort and is prepared to reinforce security of shipment, as arranged in coordination with MVMT CONTROL. (A)	← Tasks Performed by Shipper →	
	1. Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements and LEA, or for cancellation or delay of shipment, as appropriate to the assessed seriousness of the threat situation. (A)	
	2. Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and the contemplated enroute readiness actions to NRC. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T6-1	MOVER ELEMENTS	
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS	
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT / TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ENROUTE ELEMENTS PERCEIVE T3 SERIOUS. OBJECTIVE: PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO.	← PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO → The Enroute Supervisor Will: - Brief ESCORT and TRANSPORTER on perceived seriousness of situation. (A) - Contact pertinent LEA; report situation; request LEA escorts. (A) - Report situation to MVMT CONTROL. (A) - Direct ESCORT and TRANSPORTER movement operations to: a. Continue avoidance of any suspected adversary. (A) b. Avoid remote, little-traveled routes. (A) c. Close on destination (or adequate safe haven) in shortest possible time consistent with safety of movement. (A) d. Tactically screen and cover TRANSPORTER movement. (A) - If LEA escorts are not available, be prepared to dispatch "getaway" messenger in case electronic communications fail. (A) - If attack occurs or is imminent, go to T8 or T9. (A) --- - Screen and cover TRANSPORTER movement. (A) - Prepare to defend TRANSPORTER cargo against attack by coordinating actions and briefing of escort guards. (A) - In coordination with ESCORT, continue to use TRANSPORTER mobility to avoid suspected adversaries and to reduce vulnerability. (A) (Continued in adjacent column) →	- Contact pertinent LEA in advance of Enroute Elements; report situation; request LEA escorts. (A) - Contact safe haven objective (as applicable) and report situation. (A) - Report situation to Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) and to NRC. (A) - Prepare to dispatch backup TRANSPORTER and ESCORT as needed if such is indicated by situation. (C) --- TRANSPORTER (Continued) - Prepare to defend cargo against attack by alerting crew and coordinating tactical plans with ESCORT. (A) - Review procedure and criteria* for immobilizing cargo as required. (A) * e.g.: Immobilize when TRANSPORTER momentum cannot be maintained because of adversary action. Select immobilized position to block traffic and to deny opportunities to conceal cargo vehicle from the road or air.

T6-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Provides LEA escort and investigative assistance as requested. (A) - Prepares to respond with additional force as necessary to deal with unlawful acts against the shipment. (A) - Coordinates with adjacent LEA jurisdictions as necessary to provide continuous LEA escort protection. (A) - Reports by telephone (collect) to MVMT CONTROL situation information; passage of shipment to succeeding LEA jurisdictions. (A)	← Task Performed by Shipper → Continue to monitor shipment through MVMT CONTROL contacts. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T7-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
EVENT OCCURS WHILE ENROUTE THAT TEMPORARILY DEGRADES CERTAIN ENROUTE SAFEGUARDS, e.g.: - TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down. - Radio or MT equipment is damaged or jammed. - Enroute personnel gets suddenly sick. OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE PERCEIVED MAGNITUDE OF DANGER.	DETERMINE PERCEIVED MAGNITUDE OF DANGER General Tasks 1. Report situation to MVMT CONTROL; request assistance as appropriate. (A) 2. Assemble and assess information on circumstances of the event; decide if the event indicates a possible attempt at theft or sabotage of the TRANSPORTER cargo. (A) 3. If an attempt at theft or sabotage is perceived, go to T8 or T9. (A) 4. Otherwise, in coordination with MVMT CONTROL and LEA as necessary, arrange for local maintenance or medical service needed to restore TRANSPORTER mobility and continue the cargo movement. (A)		- Provide supporting assistance as requested by ENROUTE ELEMENTS. (A) - Inform LEA, Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) of changes made in movement plan and schedule. (A)

T7-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Assists in arranging for medical or maintenance services as requested. (A)	← Task Performed by Shipper →	
	Monitor shipment's progress via MVMT CONTROL contact; inform CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE (as applicable) of changes in planned schedule. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T8-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ATTACK IS PERCEIVED IMMINENT OR DEVELOPS WHILE TRANSPORTER IS AT A STOP. - Developed via T6, T7. - Just occurs. OBJECTIVE: PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO.	← PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO →		NA
	The Enroute Supervisor Will:		
	- Contact pertinent LEA, request assistance, report situation, e.g., (A) a. ID and TRANSPORTER location. b. Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.		
	- Depending upon observed adversary situation, protect TRANSPORTER cargo by: (A) a. Challenging and turning away adversary approach. (A) b. Using force as necessary to delay adversary until effective LEA response arrives. (A) c. Covering TRANSPORTER escape from situation by preventing adversary pursuit. (A) d. Following and maintaining visual contact if adversary gains possession of any part of cargo. (A) - If TRANSPORTER moves out and adversary pursues, go to T9. (A) - If enroute vehicle is damaged, go to T10 or T11. (A) - If TRANSPORTER or any part of cargo is stolen, go to T16. (A)	- Use TRANSPORTER mobility to escape from stationary situation. (A) - If unable to escape from stationary situation due to adversary actions, immobilize cargo vehicle in place. (A) - Defend cargo with force if necessary to prevent penetration by adversary. (A)	

T8-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Converges LEA patrols upon TRANSPORTER location to intercept and deal with the adversary. (A) - Pursues and apprehends adversary as necessary to recover TRANSPORTER or any cargo in their possession. (A)	NA	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T9-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ATTACK IS PRECEIVED IMMINENT OR DEVELOPS WHILE TRANSPORTER IS MOVING. - Developed via T6, T7, T8. - Just occurs. OBJECTIVE: PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO.	← PREVENT THEFT OR SABOTAGE OF CARGO → The Enroute Supervisor Will: - As applicable, contact pertinent LEA, request assistance, report situation, e.g., (A) a. ID, TRANSPORTER location, route, and movement direction. b. Adversary strength, description, disposition, activities. - Assist TRANSPORTER movement to escape adversary contact and to move toward LEA or local safe haven as applicable. (A) - Report changing location and situation to LEA as occurs. (A) - Depending upon observed adversary situation, protect TRANSPORTER cargo by: (A) a. Blocking adversary movement toward TRANSPORTER. (C) b. Immobilizing adversary transportation. (C) c. Defending cargo to prevent adversary penetration or departure with cargo until effective LEA response arrives. (C) (Continued in adjacent column) ←	- Use TRANSPORTER mobility to escape contact and to move toward LEA or local safe haven as applicable. (A) - If TRANSPORTER momentum cannot be maintained because of adversary action, immobilize cargo vehicle at position that: a. Effectively blocks traffic. (A) b. Affords little if any opportunity to conceal cargo vehicle in vicinity. (A) - If cargo vehicle is immobilized, occupy position with tractor that offers good (Continued in adjacent column) →	NA
ESCORT (Continued) d. Following & maintaining contact if adversary gains possession of any part of cargo, in order to assist LEA convergence. (A) - If enroute vehicle is damaged, go to T10 or T11. (A) - If TRANSPORTER or part of cargo is stolen to to T16. (A)			TRANSPORTER (Continued) observation and fields of fire to cover cargo location. (A) - In cordination with ESCORT defend cargo to prevent adversary penetration or departure with cargo until effective LEA response arrives. (A)

T9-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Converges with LEA patrols upon the TRANSPORTER location to intercept and deal with the adversary. (A) - Pursues and apprehends adversary as necessary to recover the TRANSPORTER or any cargo in their possession. (A)	NA	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T10-1 EVENT/OBJECTIVE	MOVER ELEMENTS — ENROUTE ELEMENTS: ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ATTACK OR ACCIDENT HAS OCCURRED; TRANSPORTER OR ESCORT IS DAMAGED WITHOUT DISPERSAL OF SNM CARGO. - Developed via T8, T9. - Just occurs. OBJECTIVE: RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPMENT.	← RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPMENT →		- Coordinate with Enroute Elements & LEA, as appropriate to situation, to arrange for escorts and guards needed for continued protection of shipment & for procurement of needed maintenance and medical service. (A) - If TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, a. Inform Enroute Elements of arrangements for local assistance to move TRANSPORTER to temporary safe haven for repair or transfer operation. (A) b. As required by situation, dispatch additional escort, replacement TRANSPORTER and material handling equipment to complete shipment. (A) c. If transfer operation is necessary, request shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE, as applicable) to send necessary personnel to transfer point to supervise the transfer. (A) d. Report situation to NRC. (A)
TRANSPORTER (Continued) c. Coordinate with enroute LEA for LEA escorts as arranged by MVMT CONTROL. (A) - If TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, a. In coordination with ESCORT provide continuous security for cargo. (A) b. Supervise local repair/evacuation operations. (A) c. Assist in transfer of cargo to replacement vehicle as arranged. (A)	The Enroute Supervisor Will: - Arrange for local emergency medical and traffic control assistance via LEA contact as needed. (A) - Notify MVMT CONTROL of situation. (A) - Arrange for local emergency repair/evacuation services for damaged vehicles as directed by MVMT CONTROL. (A) - If TRANSPORTER is reliably mobile and ESCORT is not, a. Transfer ESCORT guards to TRANSPORTER if possible. (A) b. Direct TRANSPORTER to continue trip. (A) c. Request MVMT CONTROL arrange continuing LEA escorts as dictated by the situation. (A) - If TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile, a. Request local LEA security assistance as dictated by situation. (A) b. Request MVMT CONTROL dispatch replacement TRANSPORTER, material handling equipment, and additional escorts as required to complete movement. (A) - Accomplish ESCORT reorganization directed by Enroute Supervisor. (A) - Provide continuing security for TRANSPORTER cargo during reorganization & repair or transfer operations. (A)	- If TRANSPORTER is reliably mobile and ESCORT is not, a. Assimilate additional guards from ESCORT. (A) b. Continue movement of shipment. (A) (Continued in first column)	

T10-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Assists in arranging for local maintenance and medical support as required by the situation. (A) - Accomplishes traffic control as necessary to isolate cargo vehicle location or evacuation. (A) - In coordination with MVMT CONTROL and Enroute Elements, provides temporary security assistance and escorts as needed to protect the cargo. (A)	← Tasks Performed by Shipper →	
	- In coordination with MVMT CONTROL dispatch personnel to supervise transfer operation as necessary. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T11-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ATTACK, SABOTAGE, OR ACCIDENT HAS OCCURRED; TRANSPORTER IS DAMAGED AND SNM DISPERSED - Developed via T8, T9. - Just occurs. OBJECTIVE: RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPMENT	The Enroute Supervisor Will: - Contact LEA, arrange for medical, security, and traffic control assistance as dictated by situation.' (A) - Notify MVMT CONTROL of situation; request dispatch of radiation monitoring, recovery, security, transportation, and decontamination assistance; report any observations of possible theft that might have occurred. (A) - In coordination with TRANSPORTER and LEA, cordon off TRANSPORTER and CARGO disperal areas; allow no one to enter area unless cleared by Enroute Supervisor. (A) - Assist and protect recovery, inventory, and transfer operations to prevent theft of cargo. (A) - Continue to provide escort security on resumption of cargo movement as directed by Enroute Supervisor. (A)	- Assist in protecting TRANSPORTER and cargo dispersa areas, in coordination with ESCORT and LEA. (A) - Assist recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as indicated by situation. (A) - Supervise local repair and evacuation operations regarding TRANSPORTER. (A)	RESTORE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPMENT - Notify NRC and shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable) of TRANSPORTER damage and cargo dispersal situation; request inspection, recovery, inventory, and decontamination assistance be sent to scene. (A) - Arrange dispatch of additional escort, replacement TRANSPORTER, and cargo handling equipment to provide resources as needed for transfer operation and continuation of shipment. (A) - Coordinate with Enroute Elements and LEA to arrange for the authorized operations to proceed and to ensure continued protection of the shipment when resumed. (A)

T11-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Arranges for local maintenance, radiation monitoring, and medical assistance as required by the situation. (A) - Accomplishes traffic control as necessary to isolate damaged cargo vehicle and dispersal area. (A) - In coordination with MVMT CONTROL and Enroute Elements, provides temporary security assistance and escorts as needed to protect the shipment. (A)	← Tasks Performed by Shipper → 1. Dispatch health physics personnel and recovery and inventory teams to scene to accomplish necessary cargo recovery, inventory, transfer, and decontamination operations; coordinate arrangements with NRC, MVMT CONTROL, and Enroute Elements. (A) 2. Report on-scene situation to NRC; request additional resources as required from Federal sources. (A) 3. If SNM cargo has been stolen, to to T16. (A)	

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T13-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ENROUTE ELEMENTS ARE REPORTED DELAYED OR DIVERTED FROM THE PLANNED ROUTE. OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED.	General Task Report to MVMT CONTROL, as soon as practical, delays or detours that have occurred or will occur, the reasons therefor, and location at time of report. (A)		DETERMINE IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED. - Contact LEA jurisdictions along route from location of last report to location of next planned report to determine information that might indicate a valid delay. (A) - According to information gained, request LEA to: a. Attempt to locate shipment; (A) b. Determine reasons for delay if any; (A) c. Report shipment's status and situation as determined; (A) d. Render assistance to shipment as indicated by situation. - If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed because of vehicle damage, go to T10 or T11. (A) - If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed/detoured for no obviously valid reasons, (Continued in adjacent column)
	MVMT CONTROL (Continued) a. Assume attempted theft; (A) b. Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives; (A) c. Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete shipment; (A) d. Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appropriate. (A) - If shipment cannot be located but subsequently reports, request pertinent LEA to verify that the shipment is located and moving as reported; if it is not, assume attempted theft of shipment; go to T16. (A) - If shipment cannot be located and fails to report, assume ship ment stolen; go to T16. (A)		

T13-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Accomplishes investigation as requested; informs MVMT CONTROL of results. (A) - If shipment is found and is on the planned route and schedule or is actually delayed or detoured for a valid reason, renders assistance as dictated by the situation and allows shipment to proceed; otherwise, holds shipment in custody until further disposition is indicated by MVMT CONTROL. (A)	NA	NA

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T14-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
MVMT CONTROL DOES NOT RECEIVE EXPECTED REPORT FROM ENROUTE ELEMENTS. OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED.	NA	NA	DETERMINED IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED. - Contact LEA jurisdiction along route from location of last report to location planned for missing report to determine information that might explain delayed report. (A) - According to information gained, request LEA above and those further along route to: a. Attempt to locate shipment; (A) b. Determine reason for delayed report; (A) c. Report shipment's status and situation as determined; (A) d. Render assistance to shipment as indicated by the situation. (A) - If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed because of vehicle damage, go to T10 or T11. (A) (Continued in adjacent column)
	MVMT CONTROL (Continued) - If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed/detoured for no obviously valid reasons, a. Assume attempted theft; (A) b. Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives; (A) c. Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete shipment; (A) d. Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appropriate. (A) - If shipment cannot be located, assume stolen and go to T16. (A)		

T14-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Accomplishes investigation as requested; informs MVMT CONTROL of results. (A) - If shipment is found and is on the planned route and schedule or is actually delayed/detoured for an obviously valid reason, renders assistance as dictated by the situation and allows shipment to proceed; otherwise, holds shipment in custody until further disposition is indicated by MVMT CONTROL. (A)	NA	NA

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T15-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
ENROUTE ELEMENTS DO NOT ARRIVE AT DESTINATION AS EXPECTED. OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED.	NA	NA	DETERMINED IF SNM HAS BEEN STOLEN OR SABOTAGED. - Contact LEA jurisdictions along route from location of last report to destination to determine information that might explain delayed report. (A) - According to information gained, request LEA to: a. Attempt to locate shipment; (A) b. Determine reason for delayed report; (A) c. Report shipment's status and situation as determined; (A) d. Render assistance to shipment as indicated by the situation. (A) - If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed because of vehicle damage, to to T10 or T11. - If shipment is located by LEA and is delayed/detoured for no obviously valid reasons, (Continued in adjacent column) ←
	MVMT CONTROL (Continued) a. Assume attempted theft; (A) b. Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives; (A) c. Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete shipment; (A) d. Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appropriate. (A) - If shipment cannot be located, assume stolen and go to T16. (A)		

T15-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Accomplishes investigation as requested; informs MVMT CONTROL of results. (A) - If shipment is found and is on the planned route and schedule or is actually delayed/detoured for an obviously valid reason, renders assistance as dictated by the situation and allows shipment to proceed; otherwise, holds shipment in custody until further disposition is indicated by MVMT CONTROL. (A)	← Task Performed by Shipper → - Report non-arrival of shipment to MVMT CONTROL. (A) - Report non-arrival of shipment at destination to NRC as appropriate. (A)	- Report non-arrival of shipment at destination to CONSIGNOR and MVMT CONTROL as appropriate. (A)

RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

T16-1	MOVER ELEMENTS		
	ENROUTE ELEMENTS		
EVENT/OBJECTIVE	ESCORT	TRANSPORTER	MVMT CONTROL
SNM IN TRANSIT HAS BEEN STOLEN. No Licensee/Agent Objective, reporting only.	← General Task → - Report information of theft and circumstances related thereto to MVMT CONTROL and local LEA as appropriate. (A)		- Report known information of theft and circumstances related thereto to: a. Shipper (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as applicable). (A) b. Appropriate State LEA. (A) c. FBI. (A) d. NRC. (A)

T16-2 RESPONSE LEA	CONSIGNOR	CONSIGNEE
- Assists FBI in recovering stolen SNM as applicable. (A)	← General Tasks →	
	- Report known information of theft and circumstances related thereto to FBI and NRC. (A)	
	- Assist efforts to recover stolen materials. (A)	

Appendix D

PROCEDURES SUMMARY

This appendix provides a ready reference to specific task sequences for the enroute supervisor and each of the Operational Elements. The events that have similar task sequences are grouped together along with the appropriate response procedures to be used for the various contingencies. The summary of procedures, responsibilities, and task sequences is given in the six enclosures listed below:

Enclosure 1. Enroute Supervisor's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 2. Escort's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 3. Transporter's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 4. MVMT Control's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 5. LEA's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 6. Consignee's/Consignor's Procedures Summary

Enclosure 1

Appendix D

ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the Enroute Supervisor. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Plans, directs, and coordinates the local movements and overall response actions of the enroute elements while enroute.

2. Coordinates with MVMT CONTROL and ensures that required reports from enroute elements are submitted.

3. Requests assistance and coordinates operations with LEA providing response assistance.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of:

   - present location, enroute situation, planned departure time; and
   - expected time and approximate location of the next planned report to MVMT CONTROL.

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will designate and brief a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event that mobile electronic communications fail.

3. On the move and at stops, ensure that the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net is monitored continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will use the hand-portable radios.

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information among enroute members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice.

5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPORTER position to permit good observation of the position, but not close enough to present a single target.

6. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to block surprise penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immobilize cargo vehicle as directed by the situation.

4. ENROUTE SUPERVISOR'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR:

- Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or
- Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious activity encountered while enroute, e.g.,
  - Protest demonstration or labor strike,
  - Unexplained route detour,
  - Unexplained road blockage,
  - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem,
  - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol,
  - Suspicious persons tailing shipment,
  - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop,
  - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of TRANSPORTER,

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL:

1. Ensure that threat information and on-scene assessments of the threat situation are reported to MVMT CONTROL (and the Shipper when directed) as quickly as possible, consistent with the local circumstances.

2. Direct and coordinate local movement to avoid suspicious circumstances and cover the TRANSPORTER with the ESCORT where applicable.

3. As feasible, initiate and coordinate enroute investigative activity to obtain information about the threat when necessary for assessment, e.g.,

- Query MVMT CONTROL on pertinent LEA,
- Observation of situational activity,
- Dispatch of ESCORT patrol to investigate.

4. Perform continuing assessments of the available threat information in light of the on-going enroute circumstances to decide if the threat should be considered serious while enroute.

5. If the threat is perceived serious or is reported to be so by duly constituted authority and the source of the threat is not evident, coordinate with MVMT CONTROL and implement additional enroute security measures as appropriate to deal with any attempt that might be made to carry out the threat, e.g.,

- Cancellation or delay of shipment,
- Use of alternative route or safe haven,
- Increase of guard or escort strength,
- Arrangement for and coordination with LEA escorts,
- Review procedures and place operational emphasis on security tactics, as applicable, e.g.,
  - ESCORT actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops,
  - Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formations and other actions to reduce vulnerability and increase adversary operational problems,
  - Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols,
  - Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops,
  - Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions.

6. If the threat is perceived serious and is physically evident, i.e., suspicious activity encountered:

- Alert ESCORT and TRANSPORTER to the seriousness of the situation.
- Report situation to pertinent LEA as appropriate and request LEA escorts.

- Plan, direct, and coordinate TRANSPORTER movement to:
  - Continue avoiding the suspicious activity.
  - Screen and cover the TRANSPORTER with the ESCORT.
  - Avoid remote, low-traffic-density, low-speed routes.
  - Close on destination (or safe haven) as quickly as possible consistent with safe speeds.

7. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR:

- Learns that certain enroute safeguards capabilities have been degraded or neutralized, e.g.,
  - TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down,
  - Radio or mobile telephone equipment is damaged or jammed,
  - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick,

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL:

1. Ensure, as applicable, that the situation is reported to MVMT CONTROL.

2. Investigate the circumstances of the degradation to determine if it indicates a possible incursion attempt against the shipment.

3. If an attempted incursion is perceived or appears imminent, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4. Otherwise, coordinate with MVMT CONTROL and LEA as applicable to arrange support needed to continue the cargo movement.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR:

- Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent or in process of development,

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL:

1. Contact pertinent enroute LEA, request assistance, and inform the LEA of the situation, e.g.,

- Identification of shipment; current location of TRANSPORTER; route and movement direction,

- Adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activities.

2. Report the situation to MVMT CONTROL as soon as practical under the existing circumstances.

3. Direct and coordinate ESCORT and TRANSPORTER operations to:

- Escape or avoid contact with the adversary and to move the TRANSPORTER toward the LEA or a local safe haven as appropriate.

- Assist the LEA response forces to intercept and deal with the adversary effectively.

- Protect the TRANSPORTER and cargo against penetration if contact with the adversary is unavoidable.

4. If the adversary penetrates the TRANSPORTER and departs with any part of the cargo, assist LEA intercept and hot-pursuit of the adversary by dispatching an ESCORT patrol to follow the adversary and report his position and situation until the LEA effectively gains contact.

5. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary attack or otherwise, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.4.

6. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, report the theft and the circumstances related thereto to MVMT CONTROL and to local LEA as appropriate.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR:

Learns that an ESCORT vehicle or the TRANSPORTER has been damaged by accident or an attempted adversary incursion against the shipment,

THE ENROUTE SUPERVISOR WILL:

1. Arrange for local emergency medical, traffic control, and security assistance via LEA contact as needed.

2. If the TRANSPORTER and cargo are reliably mobile and the ESCORT is not, reinforce TRANSPORTER guard with ESCORT personnel as feasible and direct TRANSPORTER to continue the trip.

3. Notify MVMT CONTROL of the situation; report any observations of theft that might have occurred; and, as applicable, arrange for:

- Additional escorts and cargo recovery or transfer assistance, along with replacement transportation as required to complete the shipment,
- Emergency repair and evacuation services,
- Emergency radiation monitoring and decontamination services.

Enclosure 2

Appendix D

ESCORT'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the ESCORT. The context and background of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. ESCORT'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

ESCORT will accomplish the general responsibilities listed below in coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the TRANSPORTER.

1. Make reports to MVMT CONTROL and communication contacts with enroute LEA to eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops for such tasks.

2. Provide security screening for TRANSPORTER to obtain early warning of suspicious situations.

3. Assist TRANSPORTER movement to avoid suspicious situations, to prevent pursuit by actual or suspected adversaries, and to ensure continued progress toward the destination (or safe haven if appropriate).

4. Request LEA assistance to deal with suspected or actual adversary incursions against the shipment or to investigate suspicious activity as appropriate.

5. Assist LEA convergence upon the TRANSPORTER location as required by the situation.

6. Guard and protect TRANSPORTER to prevent adversary access to or departure with any part of the cargo.

7. Maintain visual contact with adversaries that gain possession of any part of the cargo, and assist LEA convergence upon such adversaries.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of:

- present location, enroute situation, planned departure time,

- expected time and approximate location of the next planned report to MVMT CONTROL.

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will designate and brief a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event that mobile electronic communications fail.

3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will use the hand-portable radios.

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information among enroute members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice.

5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park ESCORT vehicle with reference to the TRANSPORTER position to permit continuous observation of the position, but not close enough to present a single target.

4. ESCORT'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT:

- Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or

- Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious situations encountered while enroute, e.g.,

  - Protest demonstration or labor strike,

  - Unexplained route detour,

  - Unexplained road blockage,

  - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem,

  - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol,

  - Suspicious persons tailing shipment,

  - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop,

  - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of the TRANSPORTER,

THE ESCORT WILL:

1. Report all information concerning the threat to the Enroute Supervisor and to MVMT CONTROL and the Shipper as directed.

2. Assist the TRANSPORTER'S movement to avoid the suspicious situation as applicable.

3. Accomplish investigations as necessary to obtain additional information on the threat and to assist the Enroute Supervisor assess the seriousness of the situation.

4. Accomplish additional enroute security measures to protect the TRANSPORTER or reduce its vulnerability as directed by the Enroute Supervisor, e.g.,

- Assimilation of additional escort strength as available,
- Coordination with LEA escorts,
- Actions to minimize or eliminate need for TRANSPORTER stops,
- Dispersion and variation in enroute movement formations and other actions to reduce vulnerability and increase adversary operational problems,
- Route reconnaissance and screening by advance guard patrols,
- Continuous all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops or while in the vicinity of suspicious activity,
- Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions.

5. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT:

Observes a temporary degradation in certain enroute safeguards capabilities, e.g.,

- Vehicle breaks down,
- Communication equipment is damaged or jammed,
- Enroute personnel get suddenly sick,

THE ESCORT WILL:

1. Investigate and report information on the circumstances leading to the event and accomplish other actions as directed by the Enroute Supervisor.

2. If an incursion attempt against the shipment is associated with the observed degradation or is announced as imminent by the Enroute Supervisor, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT:

- Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent or in process of developing,

THE ESCORT WILL:

1. Report the situation immediately to the Enroute Supervisor and the TRANSPORTER as applicable, e.g.,

   - Observed adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activity,

   - Own dispositions and activity.

2. Inform pertinent LEA of the situation and request assistance as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation.

3. Depending on the observed adversary situation, protect the TRANSPORTER cargo by:

   - Challenging and turning away any adversary approach toward the TRANSPORTER if stationary,

   - Covering the TRANSPORTER'S escape from the situation by preventing or diverting adversary pursuit,

   - Defending cargo to prevent penetration or to delay the adversary until effective LEA response arrives,

   - Following and maintaining visual contact if adversary gains possession of any part of the cargo.

4. Assist LEA convergence on the adversary by reporting location and situation as changes occur.

5. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, report all observed information concerning the theft to the Enroute Supervisor and others as directed.

6. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary action or otherwise, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.4.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE ESCORT:

- Observes that an enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or adversary attack,

THE ESCORT WILL:

1. Report the location, circumstances, and extent of damage, as applicable, to the Enroute Supervisor and to MVMT CONTROL as indicated by the situation.

2. Accomplish ESCORT reorganization actions directed by the Enroute Supervisor.

3. In coordination with TRANSPORTER and LEA, cordon off TRANSPORTER and any cargo dispersal area if applicable, allowing no one to enter without prior approval from the Enroute Supervisor.

4. Assist recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as applicable, and provide continuing security for the cargo during the reorganization period.

5. Provide continued escort security as feasible on resumption of the cargo movement.

Enclosure 3

Appendix D

TRANSPORTER'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the TRANSPORTER. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. TRANSPORTER'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

The TRANSPORTER will accomplish the general responsibilities listed below in coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT.

1. Make reports to MVMT CONTROL and request LEA assistance as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation.

2. Prevent adversary penetration of TRANSPORTER to deny adversary usage of TRANSPORTER mobility and to protect the cargo.

3. Use TRANSPORTER mobility to avoid suspicious situations, to escape suspected or actual incursion attempts, and to maintain continued progress toward destination (or safe haven if appropriate).

4. Immobilize cargo if TRANSPORTER momentum is lost because of adversary actions.

5. Assist LEA convergence on TRANSPORTER location as required by the situation.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

1. At each report to MVMT CONTROL, inform them of:

   - present location, enroute situation, planned departure time,
   - expected time and approximate location of the next planned report to MVMT CONTROL.

2. ESCORT (as primary) or TRANSPORTER (as backup) may contact LEA and MVMT CONTROL to render reports or request assistance; the Enroute Supervisor will designate and brief a "getaway" messenger to accomplish this task in an emergency in the event that mobile electronic communications fail.

3. On the move and at stops, monitor the vehicle-to-vehicle radio net continuously; members not in visual contact with enroute elements (at stops) will use the hand-portable radios.

4. As required by the situation, alert and pass situational information among enroute members by the fastest means, i.e., radio, messenger, voice.

5. At TRANSPORTER stops, park TRANSPORTER vehicle with reference to the ESCORT to permit continuous observation of the TRANSPORTER position, but not close enough to present a single target.

6. Maintain TRANSPORTER vehicle locked and manned at all times so as to block surprise penetration and to be prepared to move, operate communications, and immobilize cargo vehicle as dictated by the situation.

4. TRANSPORTER'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER:

- Receives or learns of an explicit threat made against the shipment, or
- Infers that a threat could exist from suspicious situations encountered while enroute, e.g.,
  - Protest demonstration or labor strike,
  - Unexplained route detour,
  - Unexplained road blockage,
  - Signaling to stop from apparent accident or maintenance problem,
  - Signaling to stop from apparent police patrol,
  - Suspicious persons tailing shipment,
  - Suspicious persons endeavoring to isolate a guard or driver at stop,
  - Suspicious persons endeavoring close-up or hands-on inspection of the TRANSPORTER,

THE TRANSPORTER WILL:

1. Report the TRANSPORTER'S situation and all observations concerning the threat to the Enroute Supervisor and assist in assessing the seriousness of the situation as applicable.

2. Coordinate with available ESCORT assistance and move the TRANSPORTER cargo so as to avoid suspicious situations as applicable.

3. Accomplish additional security measures to protect the TRANSPORTER or reduce its vulnerability as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation, e.g.,

- Assimilation of additional assigned TRANSPORTER guards,
- Coordination with LEA escorts,
- Coordination with the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT to accomplish required functions without having to stop the TRANSPORTER,
- Continue all-around security coverage of TRANSPORTER, particularly at stops or while in the vicinity of suspicious activity,
- Coordinated dispositions, fire plans, and movements to attain continuous mutual support among guard and TRANSPORTER positions in the event of an attack,
- Review of procedures and criteria for immobilizing cargo trailer if such action becomes necessary.

4. If an attack against the shipment is attempted or is imminent, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER:

- Observes a temporary degradation in certain enroute safeguards capabilities, e.g.,
  - Vehicle breaks down,
  - Communication equipment is damaged or jammed,
  - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick,

THE TRANSPORTER WILL:

1. As applicable to the TRANSPORTER, investigate and report information on the circumstances leading to the event and accomplish other actions directed by the Enroute Supervisor.

2. If an incursion attempt against the shipment is associated with the observed degradation, or is announced as imminent by the Enroute Supervisor, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER:

- Believes or is informed that an attack against the shipment is imminent or in process of development,

THE TRANSPORTER WILL:

1. Report the situation immediately to the Enroute Supervisor and the ESCORT as applicable, e.g.,

   - Observed adversary strength, description, dispositions, and activity,

   - Own location and activity.

2. Inform pertinent LEA of the situation and request assistance as directed by the Enroute Supervisor or otherwise as indicated by the situation.

3. Use the TRANSPORTER mobility to escape from a stationary situation or, if mobile, to avoid adversary contact and to move toward LEA or local safe haven as applicable.

4. If the TRANSPORTER cannot escape from a stop or cannot maintain its momentum because of adversary action, immobilize cargo in place if the vehicle is at a stop or, if mobile, at a position selected to:

   - Effectively block traffic,

   - Afford little if any opportunity to conceal the cargo vehicle in the immediate vicinity.

5. If cargo vehicle is immobilized, occupy a position with the tractor, as feasible, that offers good observation and fields of fire covering the cargo location.

6. In coordination with the ESCORT, defend the cargo to prevent adversary penetration or departure with cargo until effective LEA response arrives.

7. If the adversary successfully escapes with any part of the cargo, report all observed information concerning the theft to the Enroute Supervisor and others as directed.

8. If a shipment vehicle is damaged by adversary action or otherwise, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.4.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE TRANSPORTER:

- Observes that an enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or adversary attack,

THE TRANSPORTER WILL:

1. Report the location, circumstances, and extent of damage, as applicable, to the Enroute Supervisor and to MVMT CONTROL as indicated by the situation.

2. If the TRANSPORTER is reliably mobile, the ESCORT is not, and the cargo is intact,

   - Assimilate additional guards assigned by the Enroute Supervisor from the immobilized ESCORT and continue movement of the shipment.

   - Coordinate with enroute LEA escorts as arranged by MVMT CONTROL and directed by the Enroute Supervisor.

3. If the TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile or the cargo has been dispersed,

   - Coordinate with ESCORT and LEA as applicable to provide continuous security for the cargo and cargo dispersal area.

   - Assist in recovery, inventory, and transfer operations as indicated by the situation.

   - Supervise local repair and evacuation operations regarding the TRANSPORTER as applicable.

Enclosure 4

Appendix D

MVMT CONTROL'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by MVMT CONTROL. The context and background perspective of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. MVMT CONTROL'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

MVMT CONTROL will accomplish general responsibilities listed below in coordination with the Enroute Elements.

1. Track enroute progress as necessary during the shipment and inform enroute LEA of possible security threats against the shipment.

2. Arrange for and coordinate support and provide investigative assistance for enroute elements as required by the situation to ensure continued protection and progress of the shipment to the destination (or safe haven if appropriate).

3. Maintain continuing cognizance of the enroute situation during the shipment and request pertinent LEA assistance in absence of expected reports from enroute elements or to resolve suspicious situations.

4. Keep Shipper (CONSIGNOR or CONSIGNEE as applicable) informed of unusual shipment status.

5. Render reports to NRC and FBI as required by the situation and request assistance if needed.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

1. As indicated by the enroute security situation, e.g., a threat or suspicious situation is perceived serious, contact each pertinent LEA in advance of TRANSPORTER arrival in the respective jurisdictions and inform them of:

- The identification of the Enroute Elements (Company Name, Truck Number),
- Nature of the shipment (handling nuclear cargo),

- Route and direction of movement,

- ETA and ETD for the jurisdiction,

- The enroute security situation of concern.

2. Provide information, investigative assistance, and support as requested by Enroute Elements or as dictated by the situation.

3. Maintain information on current status of shipment.

4. Keep Shipper and NRC informed as to changes in movement plan and schedule and of extraordinary enroute situations.

4. MVMT CONTROL'S CONTINGENCY TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THE MVMT CONTROL:

- Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the shipment,

THE MVMT CONTROL WILL:

1. Report as soon as practical all threat information and assessments to the Shipper and to the Enroute Elements and to NRC as arranged with the Shipper; assemble additional information on the threat and adversary as available.

2. As applicable, assist the Shipper assess the threat if the shipment has not yet departed from its origin.

3. If the shipment is underway from the origin to destination, analyze the available information on the threat to assess the seriousness of the situation.

4. If the threat is perceived to be serious or is reported to be serious by duly constituted authority, coordinate with the Shipper, Enroute Elements, and pertinent LEA, as applicable, to implement increased security readiness appropriate to the perceived seriousness of the situation, e.g.:

- Cancellation or delay of the shipment.

- Use of alternative planned routes.

- Alerting and briefing of applicable safe haven objectives.

- Arrangement for and coordination with LEA assistance and escorts.

- Increase of assigned guard or escort strength.

- Alerting of backup transportation and escort for standby status.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT MVMT CONTROL:

- Receives a report from the Enroute Elements that certain enroute safeguards capabilities have been temporarily degraded or neutralized, e.g.,

  - TRANSPORTER or ESCORT vehicle breaks down,

  - Radio or mobile telephone equipment is damaged,

  - Enroute personnel get suddenly sick.

THE MVMT CONTROL WILL:

1. Arrange for the provision of supporting assistance as requested by the Enroute Elements or otherwise as indicated by the situation.

2. Inform pertinent LEA, as applicable, and the Shipper if changes are made in the movement plan or schedule.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT MVMT CONTROL:

- Receives a report from Enroute Elements or other duly constituted authority that:

  - An adversary attack has occurred against the shipment,

  - An enroute vehicle has been damaged by accident or by an adversary attack against the shipment, or

  - Part or all of the cargo has been stolen.

THE MVMT CONTROL WILL:

1. Keep the Shipper and NRC informed of the situation as applicable, e.g.,

   - The details of the adversary attack or the accident as known,

   - Amount of cargo stolen or dispersed as applicable,

   - The equipment damaged and personnel injured,

- Ongoing actions to deal with the situation,

- Any assistance needed at the scene from Federal or Shipper resources, i.e., inspection, recovery, inventory, decontamination, or transfer assistance.

2. Coordinate with Enroute Elements and LEA, as appropriate to the situation, to arrange for escorts and guards needed for continued protection of the shipment, and for procurement of needed emergency maintenance and medical services.

3. If the TRANSPORTER is not reliably mobile,

- As appropriate to the situation, arrange for local evacuation of TRANSPORTER and cargo to a temporary safe haven to accomplish necessary repair or transfer operations.

- Dispatch additional escorts, replacement cargo vehicle, and materials-handling equipment needed to complete the shipment.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THE MVMT CONTROL:

- Receives a report that the Enroute Elements have been delayed or diverted from the planned route or that they have not arrived at the destination as expected, or

- Does not receive an expected report from the Enroute Elements,

THE MVMT CONTROL WILL:

1. Contact LEA jurisdictions along the route from the location of the last report from the Enroute Elements to the location of the next planned report to determine information that might indicate a valid delay.

2. According to information gained from the above queries, request the LEA to:

- Attempt to locate the shipment.

- Determine reasons for delay if any.

- Report shipment's status and situation as determined.

- Render assistance to the shipment as indicated by the situation.

3. If the shipment is located by the LEA and is delayed because of vehicle damage, perform tasks indicated in paragraph 4.3.

4. If the shipment is located by LEA and is delayed or detoured for no obviously valid reasons,

- Assume attempted theft.
- Request LEA protect shipment until relief crew arrives.
- Dispatch ESCORT and TRANSPORTER relief crew to complete the shipment.
- Report incident to NRC and FBI for investigation as appropriate.

5. If shipment cannot be located but subsequently reports, request pertinent LEA to verify that the shipment is located and moving as reported; if it is not, request LEA to search for TRANSPORTER and apprehend; report incident to NRC and FBI for further investigation as appropriate.

6. If shipment cannot be located, assume that the shipment has been stolen; report known information concerning the suspected theft to the Shipper, NRC, FBI, and appropriate state LEA.

Enclosure 5

Appendix D

LEA'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and task sequences that are requested of the pertinent LEA in the planned contingency situations. The context and background perspective of these actions are presented in the basic plan.

2. LEA'S GENERAL FUNCTIONS

The LEAs have an overall responsibility to maintain law and order within their respective jurisdictional area. With their available resources, they endeavor to prevent illegal activities, solve crimes, and apprehend law breakers. Within the context of their law enforcement responsibilities, applicable LEA along NRC planned routes have been requested to perform the functions listed below in response to contingency situations.

1. Provide investigative assistance to check on a suspicious enroute situation or to determine status of a shipment.

2. Provide temporary escort for those shipments requiring an increased state of readiness owing to threats or suspicious situations that are encountered enroute.

3. Provide a response force to deal with unlawful adversary actions against SNM shipments within their jursidiction.

4. Provide traffic control and area isolation (cordon) for post-accident or post-attack situations.

5. Assist Enroute Elements to obtain emergency medical care and maintenance assistance if needed.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

Applicable LEA along NRC planned routes have been requested to:

1. Maintain general awareness of the frequency, company, identities, enroute composition, and the routes of the SNM shipments within their jurisdiction.

2. Report any available information to the NRC and the FBI that is indicative of possible danger to a shipment.

4. LEA TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

- An explicit threat against the shipment, or
- A civil disturbance or other suspicious occurrence encountered while enroute,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

1. Report threat information to local FBI and to pertinent NRC Regional Headquarters.

2. Provide information and investigative assistance as necessary.

3. Assist in assessing the threat as applicable.

4. Provide temporary escort of the shipment, as arranged in coordination with MVMT CONTROL, and coordinate with adjacent jurisdictions to ensure continuing LEA escorts as necessary.

5. Prepare to respond with additional force if necessary to deal with unlawful acts against the shipment.

6. Report situation information and passage of shipment to succeeding LEA jurisdications by telephone (collect or HATS) to MVMT CONTROL.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

- An unlawful attack against the shipment,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

1. Converge LEA patrols on the TRANSPORTER location to intercept and deal with the adversary.

2. Pursue and apprehend adversary as necessary to recover the TRANSPORTER or any cargo in their possession.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

- Cargo dispersal,
- Vehicle damage, or
- Sick or injured personnel in need of care,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

1. Arrange for local maintenance, radiation monitoring, and medical assistance as required by the situation.

2. Accomplish traffic control as necessary to isolate damaged cargo vehicle and dispersal area.

3. Provide temporary security assistance and escorts as needed to protect the shipment as arranged in coordination with MVMT CONTROL or the Enroute Supervisor.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT LEA ASSISTANCE IS REQUESTED REGARDING:

- A delay or diversion of Enroute Elements from the planned route, or
- Enroute Elements not reporting or arriving as expected,

THE LEA CAN BE EXPECTED TO:

1. Accomplish investigation of the situation and inform MVMT CONTROL of results.

2. Hold shipment in custody until disposition is arranged by MVMT CONTROL if the shipment is:

   - Not following the indicated route and schedule, or
   - Delayed or detoured for obviously invalid or suspicious reasons.

Enclosure 6

Appendix D

CONSIGNOR'S/CONSIGNEE'S PROCEDURES SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE

This document summarizes the general responsibilities and contingency task sequences normally accomplished by the CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE. The context and background of these duties are presented in the basic plan.

2. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES

CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE will accomplish the general repsonsibilities listed below in coordination with MVMT CONTROL.

1. Keep each other informed of shipment status and departure and arrival times as appropriate.

2. Render reports to NRC and FBI as indicated by the stituation and request assistance if needed.

3. Provide support for enroute elements as required by the situation.

3. STANDARD PROCEDURES

1. Report expected and actual shipment departure and arrival times to each other and to NRC as applicable.

2. Maintain current information on changes in movement plan and schedule and keep each other informed as appropriate.

3. Provide safe haven for TRANSPORTER upon arrival and unloading of cargo into appropriately protected facilities.

4. CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE TASK SEQUENCES

4.1 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONSIGNOR or CONSIGNEE:

- Receives or learns of an explicit threat against the shipment,

THE CONSIGNOR OR CONSIGNEE WILL:

- Report without delay all threat information:
  - To each other as applicable.
  - To MVMT CONTROL and NRC (if the Shipper).

If the shipment has not departed, the Shipper will:

- Assemble any available information on the threat and the adversary from NRC, pertinent LEA, MVMT CONTROL, and CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE as appropriate.
- Analyze the available information to assess the seriousness of the threat.
- If the threat is perceived serious or is reported to be so by duly constituted authority,
  - Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to arrange for increased readiness of enroute elements and LEA or for cancellation or delay of shipment as appropriate to the assessed seriousness of the threat situation.
  - Report the assessed seriousness of the threat and contemplated enroute readiness actions to NRC.

If the Shipment has already departed, the Shipper will:

- As applicable, assist MVMT CONTROL in assessing the threat situation and keep NRC informed of the enroute situation.

4.2 IN THE EVENT THAT THE SHIPPER (CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE AS APPLICABLE):

- Learns that the TRANSPORTER vehicle has been damaged by accident or adversary attack,

THE SHIPPER WILL:

1. Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to determine the on-scene situation and assistance required.

2. Report the situation to NRC and request additional resources, as required, from Federal Agencies.

3. Dispatch health physics personnel, recovery and inventory teams to the scene to accomplish necessary cargo recovery, inventory, transfer, and decontamination operations.

4.3 IN THE EVENT THAT THE CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE:

- Observes or learns that the enroute elements do not arrive at the destination as expected,

THE SHIPPER WILL:

- Report non-arrival of shipment to NRC and to CONSIGNEE, as appropriate.
- Coordinate with MVMT CONTROL to initiate tracer investigation and keep CONSIGNEE informed of the trace results as appropriate.

THE CONSIGNEE WILL:

- Report non-arrival of shipment at destination to the CONSIGNOR and NRC.

4.4 IN THE EVENT THAT CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE:

- Learns or infers that enroute cargo has been stolen,

THE CONSIGNOR/CONSIGNEE WILL:

1. Report known information of theft and circumstances related thereto to FBI and NRC.
2. Assist efforts to recover the stolen materials.

APPENDIX E

PRIMARY ROUTE: ALPHA PLANT, JONESVILLE, X., TO BRAVO PLANT, SMITHVILLE, G.

This appendix provides enroute information for the primary route of shipments from Alpha plant to Bravo plant. This route starts at the Alpha plant area 10 and follows the access road to U.S. Route 99, east into Bingo City, thence Interstate 77 east to the Bong City intersection with State Route 714. It then proceeds north on State Route 714 to the intersection of Smith Road, thence south on Smith Road to Bravo plant. The following enclosures are included:

Enclosure 1. Route Overview
Enclosure 2. Time and Distance Factors
Enclosure 3. Law Enforcement Response Summary
Enclosure 4. Law Enforcement Capabilities

ENCLOSURE 1 - APPENDIX E
ROUTE OVERVIEW



5.56-84

KEY

- ● LEA RESPONSE CENTER
- X STATE HIGHWAY PATROL
- ▬ CB RADIO MONITORED
- R REACT GROUP
- MT RADIOTELEPHONE (MOBILE)

ROAD TRANSPORTATION ROUTE - ALPHA TO BRAVO

1. U. S. 99 East to Bingo City
2. Interstate 77 East to Bong City
3. State Route 714 to Smith Road, Smithville
4. Smith Road South to Bravo Plant

ENCLOSURE 2 - APPENDIX E

TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS

ROUTE SEGMENTS - ALPHA, JONESVILLE, X., TO BRAVO, SMITHVILLE, G.

Segment	County LEA	Start Point	End Point	County Distance (Miles)	Total Trip Mileage	Average County Time (Min)	Total Trip Time (Hr:Min)	Variability of County Crossing Time (Min)	Variability of Total Trip Time (Min)
XRAY 0-1	Jones	Alpha Plant	Exit Bee County	14.3 (includes 2.3 in Bee County)	14.3	26	0:26	±5	±5
1-2	Charlie	Enter Charlie County	Exit Charlie County	15.5	29.8	24	0:50	±5	±7
2-3	Delta	Enter Delta County	Exit Delta County	20.4	50.2	23	1:13	±5	±8
GAMMA 3-4	Echo	Enter Gamma County	Exit Echo County	34.2	84.4	38	1:51	±3	±8
4-5	Foxtrot	Enter Foxtrot County	Exit Foxtrot County	23.2	107.6	26	2:17	±2	±8
5-6	Golf	Enter Golf County	Exit Golf County	28.8	136.4	34	2:51	±5	±9
6-7	Hotel	Enter Hotel County	Exit Hotel County	18.9	155.3	23	3:14	±2	±9

Critical Reference Points (See Notes)

A. US Route 33 to Jones County Police (Note 1).

B. US Route 22 East to Bingo City Police (Note 2).

C. US Route 44 to Charlie County Police (Note 3).

D. Exit 26 (I89) Route 5 to State Highway Patrol Station at Deetown (Note 4).

E. Exit 26 (I89) to Deetown Police (Note 5).

F. Exit 16 (I89) to Echo County Sheriff, Evanstown, G. (Note 6).

G. US Route 12 Exit 14 (I89) to Foxtrot County Sheriff (Note 7).

H. Exit 11 (I89) to Golf County Sheriff (Note 8).

I. US Route 32 to Gamma State Patrol (Note 9).

J. All mile markers in Segment 6-7 (Note 10).

5-56-85

ENCLOSURE 2 - APPENDIX E

TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS

ROUTE SEGMENTS - ALPHA, JONESVILLE, X., TO BRAVO, SMITHVILLE, G.

(Continued)

Segment	County LEA	Start Point	End Point	County Distance (Miles)	Total Trip Mileage	Average County Time (Min)	Total Trip Time (Hr:Min)	Variability of County Crossing Time (Min)	Variability of Total Trip Time (Min)	Critical Reference Points (See Notes)
7-8	Item	Enter Item County	Exit Item County	25.5	180.8	28	3:42	±3	±10	K. Exits 10, 9, 8, (I89) as directed (Note 11).
8-9	Jake	Enter Jake County	Exit Kilo County	29.7 (includes 5.5 in Kilo County)	210.5	40	4:22	±5	±11	None (Note 12).
9-10	Lime	Enter Lime County	Exit Lime County	30.6	241.1	39	5:01	±5	±12	None (Note 12).
10-11	Smith	Enter Smith County	Exit Smith County	17.9	259.0	24	5:25	±3	±12	L. Bravo Plant (Note 13).

5.56-86

NOTES: CRITICAL REFERENCE POINTS

1. Pt. A - Exit US Route 33 in Beetown, Xray, at courthouse (corner of Main St. and Way). Right turn on Way St.; proceed one block to Church St.; police (State) here has central dispatch. Telephone: (888) 354-4123, 354-4124.

2. Pt. B - Exit near center of Bingo City (one block after railroad tracks), right turn on US Route 127 (East); proceed east approximately 5 blocks to 800 East Main St., new brick building. Police in force available. Central communications to State and county forces. Future exit from Xray Route 187 will be located one block northwest. Telephone: (888) 692-4141. Three-man FBI group located in city.

3. Pt. C - Entering Bingo City on US Route 99, turn left one block beyond 4th active traffic light (5th light from city limits). After turn, 2½ blocks at Ash St. courthouse. County Sheriff's Office is located in building. Telephone: (888) 623-1717, 623-1718.

4. Pt. D - Exit 26 from I89 and turn left on US Route 5. Approximately 4½-5 miles north on Route 5 is an Xray State Highway Patrol Station at Deetown. Telephone: (888) 641-333.

5. Pt. E - Exit 26 and proceed as above. Pass Highway Patrol. Deetown P.D. is 1½ miles farther on corner of East Sevier. Telephone: (888) 521-1616.

ENCLOSURE 2 - APPENDIX E

TIME AND DISTANCE FACTORS

ROUTE SEGMENTS - ALPHA, JONESVILLE, X., TO BRAVO, SMITHVILLE, G.

(Continued)

NOTES: CRITICAL REFERENCE POINTS

6. Pt. F - Exit 16 from I89; turn left and proceed back under I89. Enter Evanstown and turn right at first traffic light. Proceed through next traffic light and up a steep grade. At top turn right (courthouse is on left side at top); go downhill one block to Echo County Sheriff's Department. Telephone: (555) 721-6141.

7. Pt. G - Exit 14, Route 12 from I89. Freetown, G., at 2nd traffic light turn left and proceed 3 blocks to courthouse on Main Street. Foxtrot County Sheriff is located behind courthouse. Telephone: (555) 283-1240.

8. Pt. H - Exit 11 from I89 to Geetown (US Route 21). Turn right on 6th St., one block to Circuit Court Building. Golf County Sheriff is located in basement. Telephone: (555) 844-3217, 211-7486.

9. Pt. I - US Route 21 to Gamma State Highway Patrol. Continue on I89 toward Fort Beta (7-mile section of I89 is not completed in this area). In this section, approximately 5 miles north of Exit 13 of I89 is State Police HQ on the north side of highway, which is 4-lane divided. Telephone: (555) 715-1313.

10. Pt. J - All mile markers on I89 in Golf County. Sheriff requests you give nearest mile marker at time of problem over CB radio and telephone. Two county cars monitor CB and also make contacts with Gomer React. Use CB immediately when in trouble and proceed on course. Help will converge on you as soon as possible. Telephone: (555) 488-6666 emergency; routine calls 804-6020.

11. Pt. K - Proceed to nearest exit from I89, either 10, 9, or 8 depending on location. Notify Item County Sheriff on CB of exit number. Expect instructions on CB or telephone. County Sheriff has CB radio and works with React. Telephone: (555) 345-6789.

12. Continue on I89, 54, and US Route 123 and request assistance on CB and telephone:

a. Jake County Sheriff:
(555) 821-1917 Emergency
(555) 831-2018 ext. 206 routine
Have: CB Monitor - React

b. Lime County Sheriff
(555) 711-1914
(555) 256-7654
Have: 4 CB Units

c. Bong City Police
(555) 454-9876
Have: React

13. Continue toward plant. Call for assistance on CB Radio. County Sheriff has base station CB and mobile units. Telephone: (555) 233-8715 emergency; (555) 266-1313, 266-1314 routine.

ENCLOSURE 3 - APPENDIX E
LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY
ROAD ROUTE ALPHA, XRAY, TO BRAVO, GAMMA[1]

COUNTY DATA		CHIEF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY					RESPONSE CAPABILITY		
					CB Monitor[4]		Patrol Cars[5] Per Shift	Response Times[6] (minutes)	
County	Distance/Time[2]	Name	Location	Telephone[3]	LEA	REACT		1st Car	Addtl. Cars
XRAY[7]									
Jones (Bee)	12 mi/23 min (2.3 mi/3 min)	John Jones, Sheriff	Jonesville, X.	(808) 634-2715	Yes	Yes	4	5	15
Charlie	15.5 mi/24 min	Moe Miller, Sheriff	Beetown, X.	(888) 793-2151	Yes	No	5	5	10
		Ralph Brown, Chief of Police	Bingo City, X.	(888) 423-1111	No	Yes	9	5	10
Delta	20.4 mi/23 min	Jay Sturet Sheriff	Deetown, X.	(888) 876-7112			6	5	10
GAMMA[7]									
Echo	34.2 mi/38 min	J. D. Smith Sheriff	Evanstown, G.	(555) 739-0529	No	Yes	8	5	15
Foxtrot	23.2 mi/26 min	Marty Marion Sheriff	Freetown, G.	(555) 984-5796	Yes	No	4	5	10
Golf	28.8 mi/34 min	Walter Black Sheriff	Geetown, G.	(555) 347-6973	Yes	Yes	3	10	15
Hotel	18.9 mi/23 min	H. Martin Murphy Sheriff	Hotville, G.	(555) 283-4574	Yes	Yes	3	10	10
Item	25.5 mi/28 min	Ronnie Smith Sheriff	Inkville, G.	(555) 544-2525	No	Yes	7	10	17-18
Jake	24.2 mi/32 min	D. Dewight Doe Sheriff	Jakeston, G.	(555) 387-1102	Yes	Yes	9	5	10
		Chief Newton Chief of Police	Bong (City), G.	(555) 347-6978					

ENCLOSURE 3 - APPENDIX E
LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE SUMMARY
ROAD ROUTE ALPHA, XRAY, TO GRAVO, GAMMA[1]
(Continued)

COUNTY DATA		CHIEF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY					RESPONSE CAPABILITY		
County	Distance/Time[2]	Name	Location	Telephone	CB Monitor[4] LEA	REACT	Patrol Cars[5] Per Shift	Response Times[6] (minutes) 1st Car	Addtl. Cars
(Kilo) Lime	(5.5 mi/8 min) 30.6 mi/39 min	I. M. Sad Sheriff	Sayer, G.	(555) 437-8192	4 cars Yes		5	15	15
Smith	17.9 mi/24 min	Chief Bill Burgin Chief of Police	Smithville, G.	(555) 654-1170	No	Yes	20	2	5
		William Bailey Sheriff	Dustville, G.	(555) 251-4141	Yes Base Station	Yes	6	5	7-8
Totals	259 mi/5 hr 25 min								

5.56-69

Notes:

1. Route US 99, East to Bingo City, X.; I-77 to Bong City Intersection with State Route 714; South on Smith Road to Bravo Plant.
2. Distance across county via routes indicated in Note 1; transit times are based on travel at posted speed limits ±5 mph.
3. For emergencies.
4. Citizens band radio.
5. All agencies indicated have cooperative agreements and communications with the adjacent counties and municipalities and with State police.
6. Time after initial notification.
7. In addition to the county sheriffs and city police listed here, there are also three State Highway patrol posts along this route. These posts have a limited capability in comparison to the selected county sheriffs. They can be contacted via telephone as follows:

   1. Deetown, Xray (888) 354-2121
   2. Freetown, Gamma (555) 222-6161
   3. Inkville, Gamma (555) 974-6322

   Additional information is given in Critical Reference Points, Enclosure 2.

ENCLOSURE 4 - APPENDIX E

LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES

The eleven County Sheriffs that provide the primary response force for the Jonesville, Xray, to Smithville, Gamma, route have county patrol strengths varying from 11 to 42 officers. Their normal patrol unit in general consists of one man per vehicle. Patrols are armed with individual's pistols and a riot control shotgun. In an emergency situation, these weapons can be augmented with automatic weapons, semiautomatic rifles, and tear gas if required. The referenced city police forces along the route have similar or greater capabilities. In all cases, there are mutual aid agreements with adjacent and higher jurisdictions that would be used to obtain reinforcements if necessary.

All the referenced enroute LEA, with the sole exception of the Gamma State Highway Patrol, have modern car-to-car radio communication systems. Unfortunately there is no single channel that will provide continuous communications by the enroute element with all the enroute LEA forces. However, all the county LEA either monitor the citizen's band radio or work with a local REACT group.

Each enroute Sheriff's department typically operates a central dispatch facility that has equipment to maintain communication between counties, between a county and adjacent states, and between a county and local and state law agencies. In addition, there are hot-line telephones or one-digit dial systems between adjacent LEA jurisdictions.

In addition to car-to-car and car-to-central-station radio communications, many patrol units also have a walkie talkie system that can be relayed by the vehicle back to the base station.

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