

REACTOR SAFETY AND LICENSING ACTIVITIES

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation December 9, 2004

ACRONYMS

- ANS: American Nuclear Society
- BWR: Boiling-water reactor
- CFR: Code of Federal Regulations
- EPU: Extended power uprate
- FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
- GSI: Generic Safety Issue
- ISO: Independent system operator
- MSPI: Mitigating Systems Performance Index
- NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute
- NERC: North American Electric Reliability Council
- PRA: Probabilistic risk assessment
- PWR: Pressurized-water reactor
- RES: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
- RS: Review Standard
- SDP: Significance determination process
- SE: Safety evaluation

AGENDA

- Overview J. Dyer
- Emerging Technical Issues B. Sheron
 - Power Uprate-Related Technical Issues
 - Generic Safety Issue 191
 - Electric Grid Reliability
 - Buried, Medium Energy Cables
- Fire Protection J. Hannon
- Reactor Oversight Process S. Richards

EMERGING TECHNICAL ISSUES

Dr. Brian W. Sheron

ADVERSE FLOW EFFECTS FROM POWER UPRATES

- Some plants experiencing adverse flow effects during extended power uprate (EPU) operation
- Higher steam and feedwater flow causing vibration and acoustic loading

ADVERSE FLOW EFFECTS

- Safety concern is failure of steam dryer that can result in loose parts in primary system
- Boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with "square hood" steam dryer and high steam velocity currently considered most susceptible
- EPU flow-induced vibrations have also caused failures of feedwater probes and safety-related valves

INDUSTRY ACTIVITIES

- Two units have reduced power to pre-EPU levels and are replacing the steam dryers
- BWR licensees are monitoring and inspecting for signs of dryer degradation
- BWR Owners' Group leading industry activities to resolve issues

STAFF ACTIVITIES

- Evaluating plant-specific response to adverse flow effects
- Carefully reviewing current power uprate requests for consideration of flow effects
- Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) activities to understand adverse flow effects
- Developing criteria for determining the acceptability of future power uprate requests

FUTURE PLANS

- Review licensee justifications for
 - returning most susceptible units to EPU operation
 - Continued operation at EPU levels for two other susceptible units
 - Review two current requests for EPU operation
 - Monitor/review BWR Owners' Group actions and determine need for generic communication

GENERIC SAFETY ISSUE (GSI) - 191

- Post accident debris accumulation on pressurized-water reactor (PWR) sump screens may lead to inadequate long-term core cooling.
- Bulletin 2003-01
- Generic Letter 2004-02

STATUS

- Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI 04-07, "PWR Containment Sump Evaluation Methodology"
- Staff responded to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards comments on NEI evaluation methodology and staff safety evaluation (SE)
- SE on the evaluation methodology

STATUS (Continued)

- Public meetings and NEI workshop
 December 2004
- Chemical precipitation effects testing November 2004
- Downstream effects to be evaluated when performing overall evaluation-methodology

CONCLUSIONS

- The SE and NEI Guidance document provide a conservative and acceptable evaluation methodology
- The staff intends to proceed such that this issue can be closed on schedule - December 2007

GRID RELIABILITY

- August 14, 2003 Blackout Event raised concerns regarding the reliability of offsite power
- Risk insights pointed to the following:
 - Long duration Loss of Offsite Power events are safety significant
 - Risk increases due to online equipment outages
 - Grid is less reliable during the Summer period

STAFF ACTIVITIES

- Staff raised awareness by issuing Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-05
- Staff issued Temporary Instruction 2515/156, "Offsite Power System Operational Readiness"
- NRC entered into memoranda of agreements with NERC and FERC
- RES Reports

NEXT STEPS

- The staff is considering a generic communication to address:
 - -Agreements between the plant and independent system operator (ISO)
 - Ensure plant voltage needs against grid voltage predictions
- Staff may reevaluate regulatory requirements

BURIED CABLE FAILURES

- 22 reported buried cable failures
 - Failed cables were not qualified for moist environment
 - Most failed cables were within 10 to 20 years of service life
- Increased number of failures are expected to occur as plants age
- Failure of certain buried cables could lead to loss of a train or safety function

REGULATORY ACTIONS

- Staff sent a letter to industry on February 5, 2004 and held a public meeting on June 2, 2004
- Staff awaiting industry white paper on issue
- Staff is evaluating options

FIRE PROTECTION

John Hannon

CLOSURE OF LONG-STANDING ISSUES

- Risk-informed performance-based rule, circuit analysis, and operator manual actions rulemaking
- Management of emerging issues
- Use of state of the art tools

RISK-INFORMED PERFORMANCED BASED RULEMAKING

- Rule & Enforcement Policy issued June 2004
- Draft Regulatory Guide issued for comment in September 2004
- Endorsement of industry guidance on implementation

CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

- Issued Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-03 in March 2004
- Circuit analysis inspection resumes January 2005
- Generic communication in early 2005 on compliance expectations with Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50

OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS RULEMAKING

- Public meetings on acceptance criteria (November 2003 and June 2004)
- Proposed rule and draft regulatory guide to Commission in December 2004

EMERGING ISSUES

 Protocol for resolution of emerging fire protection issues exists between industry and NRC for low risk items.

REGULATORY TOOLS

- Revised fire protection significance determination process (May 2004)
- Fire Dynamics Tools (November 2004)
- Fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) Requantification Study and Fire Modeling Verification & Validation supported by RES
- American Nuclear Society (ANS)
 Fire PRA Standard (early 2005)

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REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS ISSUES

Stu Richards

FY 2003 INDUSTRY TRENDS RESULTS

- No statistically significant adverse industry trends in safety performance identified
- Three "Early Warning" prediction limits were crossed

FY 2004 INDUSTRY TRENDS PRELIMINARY RESULTS

- Data through June 2004
 - All Industry Trend Indicators below "early warning" prediction limits
- Final data available January

MITIGATING SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE INDEX (MSPI) ACTIVITIES

- One year pilot of MSPI completed in early 2004
- Significant issues resolved
- Target implementation date for early 2006

MSPI ACTIVITIES (continued)

- Staff-industry PRA task force created
- Implementation details under development
- MSPI to be implemented at all sites at the same time

SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS (SDP) TIMELINESS

- Goal: 85 percent of findings dispositioned in < 90 days
- Current SDP timeliness about
 70 percent
- Fire protection and unique issues have been particularly challenging

CONSIDERATIONS TO IMPROVE SDP TIMELINESS

- Use modified SDP Phase 2 result as preliminary risk estimate
- Develop qualitative criteria for findings not amenable to SDP
- Adhere to strict time lines
- Use new information to revisit previously evaluated findings

STATUS OF DESIGN/ENGINEERING PILOT PROGRAM

- Vermont Yankee pilot inspection completed
 - no risk significant issues identified (eight green issues)
 - suggest the need to assess aspects of current inspection program (power uprate/generic issues)

STATUS OF DESIGN/ENGINEERING PILOT PROGRAM (Continued)

- VC Summer inspection complete
- Diablo Canyon and Kewaunee scheduled for early 2005

CONCLUSIONS